It took awhile to verify the information I passed along in my previous post. It appears it was the list of email addresses which were outed. See the following original source article from Talking Points Memo Muckraker:

D'Oh: House Panel Screw-Up Reveals Whistleblower Email Addresses
By Paul Kiel - October 26, 2007, 10:07PM
Here's a whoops with a capital W.

This summer the House Judiciary Committee launched an effort to collect tips from would-be whistleblowers in the Justice Department. The U.S. attorney firings scandal had shown that much was amiss in the Department, and with the danger of retaliation very real, the committee had set up a form on the committee's website for people to blow the whistle privately about abuses there. Although the panel said it would not accept anonymous tips, it assured those who came forward that their identity would be held in the "strictest confidence."

But in an email sent out today, the committee inadvertently sent the email addresses of all the would-be whistleblowers to everyone who had written in to the tipline. The committee email was sent to tipsters who had used the website form, including presumably whistleblowers themselves, and all of the recipients of the email were accidentally included in the "to:" field -- instead of concealing those addresses with a so-called blind carbon copy or "bcc:".

Only the email addresses were exposed; none of the names or other identifying information of the whistleblowers was revealed. The blunder, however, was noticed by a number of people who had used the website form and received today's email. One disgruntled recipient replied to the entire list of whistleblowers angrily complaining about the snafu; two others forwarded the committee email to TPMmuckraker with similar complaints.

Compounding the mistake, the committee later sent out a second email attempting to recall the original email; it, too, included all recipients in the "to:" field, according to a recipient of the emails.

A committee spokesperson emailed the following statement in response to TPMmuckraker's questions:

The tip line was created to be a confidential method for Justice Department employees to provide the Judiciary Committee with information that might aid the Committee in its ongoing investigation of politicization at the Justice Department. Because of the confidentiality agreement, the Committee will not discuss any emails sent on this tip line. A technological error in a recent communication inadvertently disclosed certain email addresses. The Committee has not begun its review of the emails, and does not know if any of them are in fact from Justice Department employees as opposed to private citizens expressing more general views. The Committee apologizes for any concern this error may have caused, and is making every effort to protect the confidentiality of those who chose to provide information on the tip line.
It's not immediately clear whether the mistake will lead to the exposure of those who had contacted the committee. There are more than 150 recipient addresses revealed in the email. Some of the email addresses appear to be transparently fake, but there's also, much more troubling, a vice_president@whitehouse.gov carbon copied on the email, which is the public email address for Vice President Dick Cheney. In other words, an email containing the email addresses of all the whistleblowers who had written in to the committee tipline was sent to public email address of Vice President Cheney.

The purpose of today's mis-sent email was, ironically enough, to announce careful new procedures about to be put in place by the committee for reviewing the tips received through the committee's website. No one on the committee or any staff has reviewed any of the tips, pursuant to an agreement reached between committee Democrats and Republicans. Only "Members of the Judiciary Committee, and Committee staff specifically designated by the Democratic Chairman or Ranking Republican Member, will have access to the e-mails, and they are prohibited from removing any e-mail from Committee offices," today's email read. "This message is also to advise you that you have three business days...­ to notify us if you wish to withdraw your e-mail rather than have it reviewed by the Committee under these procedures."

The email can be read below the fold:

Subject: Important notice re House Judiciary Committee tip line, e-mails

You are among the people who have submitted e-mails to the U.S. House Judiciary Committee on its Web site tip line for Department of Justice employees to report allegations or concerns regarding possible wrongdoing involving the Department. This message is to inform you that the Committee is now ending the tip line and has voted to approve procedures governing the confidentiality of the e-mails received.

Under these procedures, only Members of the Judiciary Committee, and Committee staff specifically designated by the Democratic Chairman or Ranking Republican Member, will have access to the e-mails, and they are prohibited from removing any e-mail from Committee offices. Any broader disclosure of any e-mail would first require a vote of the Committee to authorize it. It would be the Committee¹s intent to consult with the sender of any e-mail before any such vote takes place.

This message is also to advise you that you have three business days ­ until 11:59 p.m. on Tuesday, October 30 ­ to notify us if you wish to withdraw your e-mail rather than have it reviewed by the Committee under these procedures. If you so notify us, your e-mail, along with any records pertaining to its submission, will be destroyed. If you do not so notify us, we will conclude that you have agreed to submit your e-mail to the Committee under these procedures.

Any request that an e-mail be withdrawn should state in the subject space "PLEASE WITHDRAW E-MAIL," and should include in the body of the request the e-mail address under which your e-mail was submitted, if different than the one used to make the request to withdraw. It should also specify the date and time, if known, or the approximate date and time, that the e-mail was submitted.

Thank you for your interest in the Judiciary Committee¹s work.

From http://thenexthurrah.typepad.com
About that Need for a Whistleblower Law...
by emptywheel

I believe it was just the other day when I was saying it was more
urgent to implement whistleblower protection than to write a new
journalist shield law. This doesn't change my opinion in that regard.
This summer the House Judiciary Committee launched an effort to
collect tips from would-be whistleblowers in the Justice Department.
The U.S. attorney firings scandal had shown that much was amiss in
the Department, and with the danger of retaliation very real, the
committee had set up a form on the committee's website for people to
blow the whistle privately about abuses there. Although the panel
said it would not accept anonymous tips, it assured those who came
forward that their identity would be held in the "strictest
confidence."
But in an email sent out today, the committee inadvertently sent the
email addresses of all the would-be whistleblowers to everyone who
had written in to the tipline. The committee email was sent to
tipsters who had used the website form, including presumably
whistleblowers themselves, and all of the recipients of the email
were accidentally included in the "to:" field -- instead of
concealing those addresses with a so-called blind carbon copy
or "bcc:".
See, if we didn't force our whistleblowers to sneak around so much,
this wouldn't be the monumental **** up it is. As it is though, this
is likely to discourage a more whistleblowers from coming forward.
That say, I will at least entertain (for the moment) that this was
deliberate. The Republicans have always hated this tip line--they've
been trying to shut it down since Conyers started this. And the email
explained that the tip line has now been shut down.
This message is to inform you that the Committee is now ending the
tip line and has voted to approve procedures governing the
confidentiality of the e-mails received.
So this email included the emails of everyone who has--or will--
submit a tip to the tip line. And that entire list was carbon copied
to Cheney's office.
Some of the email addresses appear to be transparently fake, but
there's also, much more troubling, a vice_president@...
carbon copied on the email, which is the public email address for
Vice President Dick Cheney.
In other words, it would be very smart poker if some disloyal
Democratic staffer or a Republican staffer to "accidentally" send
Cheney the list of all those who were revealing secrets about DOJ.
There have been some Republican leaks of damaging testimony in the
past. What would it take for someone to "accidentally" make this tip
line backfire--to make it serve the intelligence purposes of those
trying to avoid responsibility for politicizing DOJ, rather than the
opposite?

By G.F. Scott
October 28, 2007

What constitutes a “Revolving Door” as in corrupted government and industry? Employees who start in industry and move to government and use their position, authority or influence to aid, or facilitate their former employer in achieving corporate goals is one scenario. They may be able to influence development and writing of government policies and regulations as well as how government policies and regulations will be implemented and enforced. Employees who start out in government, and then move to industry using their previous connections, ability to influence, intimidate, or coerce former colleagues, or employees previously supervised in order to aid or facilitate their new employer’s corporate goals is another scenario. Or someone who starts in government, may be lured, or coerced into acting in industry’s best interests and then later may be offered the high paying pay-off job at the company they helped while they were in federal employ. Any of these scenarios, potentially ethically challenging, can involve quid pro quo agreements for the benefit of individuals or corporations and may not in the best interest of the taxpayers or our government. And evidence is available that shows that some employees move back and forth between government and industry positions repeatedly, potentially repeating questionable conflict of interest activities over time.

Nearly always, financial gain is a big component of these types of arrangements. Because of the risks to government interests there are currently policies in place prohibiting an employee moving from a position of power, authority, influence or oversight concerning a particular contractor, directly to a position in that contractor’s employ. The purpose of these policies is to avoid the possible compromises or quid pro quo “deals” that might be arranged which might not be in the taxpayers or government’s best interests. Generally there are stipulated cooling off periods required, before employees may make certain job movements.

How can one tell if it is just a smart career move or indeed is a revolving door maneuver, complete with the typical manipulation, corruption, and payoff one might expect? It’s not always an easy thing to identify, until the person proves himself or herself by word and deed what their goals and purposes are. However, a person’s education, professional experiences, political connections and other elements may be illuminating and an indication of possible conflict of interest.

One of the most noted cases of Revolving Door Corruption recently, was that of D.D., who served as a government employee, (USAF), for a number of years, vocally advocating for a particular defense contractor while doing her contracting job, instead of advocating for the benefit of the taxpayers in government defense contracts. Eventually, D.D. left government employ and resurfaced as an employee of the very company she had championed while managing government defense contracting, which benefited that company. After information came out and controversy erupted over the infamous “Tanker Deal” D.D., the Defense Contractor’s top acquisition official, and the Defense Contractor’s Chief Financial Officer, M.S. were both fired by the Defense Contractor, and after a legal battle both pled guilty to conflict of interest and ethics crimes and were sentenced accordingly.

Here are some examples of other possible Revolving Door scenarios:

A.E. started out as a legislative assistant for National Security Affairs for a Representative to the House of Representatives, and then moved on to serve as an employee of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, where he then spent 13 years learning his craft, and had been promoted to the position of staff director. From staff director of the House Committee on Armed Services, he was recruited to move to a large Defense Contractor, taking the position of Vice President, Aircraft & Missiles Programs, in the company’s Government Relations office in Washington DC.

His new corporate duties were to be responsible for leading the development and execution of government relations strategies for the company’s programs and issues related to the Department of Defense and in support of the company’s Aircraft & Missiles business unit headquartered in St. Lois, Missouri. The company states in a press release that their Aircraft and Missiles group manages numerous Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps programs as well as Aerospace Support programs and the Joint Strike Fighter program as well. His new employer waxed eloquently about this new employee’s attributes in the same press release, stating “We are proud to have a true professional with such proven leadership skills and extensive experience in Washington D.C., as we strive to become more customer-focused, this employee’s vast knowledge of the defense department’s programs and policies will serve us well.” It appears A.E. is still in this position, and involved in various activities to plan and coordinate efforts to influence decisions and win contracts for his current defense industry employer.

G.G. started out as a Security Specialist for Defense Investigative Service (now called Defense Security Service), and was over time, promoted to Deputy Director, Industrial Security. G.G. was very active in professional organizations and in government “reinvention” and reform, including promoting major changes in the relationship between government oversight and industry, particularly in advocating for involving industry in the writing of policy and procedural changes, and reworking how oversight would be allowed to work within the agency. He was a presenter and active participant at conferences in the security field. He left his management position at DSS and went directly to the position of Director, Security and Fire Protection and Facility Security Officer at a large defense contractor, at that time based in Seattle. There is evidence to suggest that he continued to try to influence and/or coerce former colleagues and subordinates in DSS regarding implementation of policy, regulations, and enforcement and oversight activities involving G.G.’s new defense contractor employer.

C.H. founded a business with her partner/husband. She then became the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense C3I. She was active in the government “reinvention” activities also in her role of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security and Information Operations in the George W. Bush Administration, replacing William Leonard in November 2001. Prior to taking Leonard’s job, she worked with DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency), and was a member of the Defense Science Board (DSB).

Subsequently, her company, “actually a one man shop run by a government consultant,” (her husband), was awarded lucrative contracts in Iraq while she continued to remain in her Defense Department government position. Her company was hired by SAIC (Science Applications International Corp.), said to be one of the most politically connected government contractors holding government contracts in Iraq.

She subsequently gave testimony about TALON in a hearing before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, urging it’s purchase and use by the government. TALON, (a program run by the JPEN program), was developed by CellExchange Inc, which is a defense-contracting partner of SAIC. C.H. underwent an investigation because of allegations of conflict of interest, but denied anything improper had occurred.

Most recently, C.H. has joined the Board of advisors for Cybrinth LLC, which deals in data custody and information security. She is also on the Boards of Oakley Networks, a leading force in the Insider Threat prevention market and ICx advanced technology and sensor solutions for military and homeland security, all of which are actively seeking government contracts.

Now, consider again the definition of Revolving Door, and the intent of the prohibitions of such activities for government and industry employees. These are but a few of the examples of questionable government and industry employee movements and activities. It seems reasonable to question the lack of government enforcement of even current policies intended to avert conflict of interest and other corruptions, let alone the lack of development of new stricter personnel policies to assure ethics in government contracting.

Defense Contract Award Protested
By Walter F. Roche Jr.
The Los Angeles Times

Friday 26 October 2007

Washington - A Defense Department medical services contract worth up to $790 million was awarded last month to a Wisconsin-based company three months after it hired a former Bush administration appointee who had supervised military health programs at the Pentagon for the last six years.

William Winkenwerder Jr., assistant secretary of Defense for health affairs from 2001 until April, joined Logistics Health Inc. as a director and consultant in June. The firm beat out two other bidders with proposals that ranged from $80 million to $100 million less, records show. Under the new contract, Logistics Health will provide immunizations and physical and dental exams for reservists and National Guard members.

Logistics Health of LaCrosse, Wis., is headed by another ex-official of the Bush administration - former Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson.

"They stacked the deck," said Fran Lessans, president of Passport Health, one of the losing bidders. Her Baltimore-based firm lost despite a bid projected over five years to cost nearly $100 million less than Logistics Health's winning proposal.

"It was wired. There is no doubt in my mind," Lessans said of the Defense procurement process.

Two other firms involved in the bidding have filed formal protests with the Government Accountability Office. A draft copy of one protest letter, reviewed by The Times, cited Winkenwerder's role and complained that the winning bidder may have "gained unequal access to information not available to other competitors" by hiring the former Pentagon official.

"This creates an organizational conflict of interest and potentially constitutes prohibited contact," the draft letter said.

Winkenwerder called such allegations inaccurate and untruthful. In e-mail responses to The Times, he said he had nothing to do with the procurement process or the selection of Logistics Health. He also said he had not begun contacts with Logistics officials about the directorship and consulting job until after he had resigned his Defense Department post.

His role at Logistics Health is to provide advice, he said, "on a variety of issues that are of concern and priority to the company. Government rules do not prohibit such advice in any way."

The rules bar him from contacting his former Pentagon colleagues on Logistics' behalf, "and I have followed those rules scrupulously. Further I support such rules and place a high importance on strict ethical behavior in all of my conduct."

Diana Henry, a spokeswoman for Logistics Health, said in a written statement that the company "conducts all of its business activities in a highly ethical and professional manner."

The contract, awarded in September, supports the Defense Department's Reserve Health Readiness Program. In prepared remarks for a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee two years ago, Winkenwerder said the program's goal was "to identify and proactively assist service members in getting needed support for deployment-related concerns." Besides routine exams, the program will provide full medical assessments to reservists and Guard members returning from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Logistics Health will be paid an estimated $151 million for the first year of a contract that can be renewed annually and extended up to five years at a total cost of about $790 million.

In other letters of protest filed with the GAO, officials of rival firms also charged that Logistics won the pact despite questions raised about its performance under a previous agreement with the Department of Health and Human Services. That pact, originally awarded in 2001, only applied to the Army, while the new one includes the Navy, Air Force and Marines.

Kenneth Moskowitz, an attorney for the Pennsylvania-based United States Military Dental Corp., said in an Oct. 12 letter that Logistics' prior performance and practices under the Health and Human Services contract "put reservists and National Guardsmen at possible undue risk."

He told the GAO that "no one was assigned to specifically monitor the level of care" received by military personnel and that the company operated with "a built-in incentive to lower provider cost for added profit." The Pennsylvania company was a subcontractor for Comprehensive Health Services of Florida, one of the failed bidders.

A spokesman for the Defense Department, citing the pending protests, declined to respond to a series of detailed questions about the contract and the selection process.

Records reviewed by The Times show that the Logistics Health bid also survived a major last-minute change when partner QTC Management abruptly withdrew days before the contract was awarded.

QTC Chairman Anthony J. Principi, another former Bush appointee, was secretary of Veterans Affairs.

The GAO has until early January to act on the protests.

The Defense Department gave initial notice of its intent to put the newly expanded program out to bid in October 2006.

Winkenwerder resigned from his Pentagon post April 16, and his appointment to the Logistics board was announced May 31. It became effective the next day. In announcing Winkenwerder's appointment, Thompson said: "He brings with him a wealth of knowledge and also shares LHI's commitment of helping military members receive the healthcare and support they deserve. He is a tremendous addition to our board of directors."

The formal notice of the bidding process was issued June 12. Bids were due July 26. On Sept. 10, QTC formally withdrew from the Logistics proposal. And on Sept. 25, the contract was awarded to Logistics.

-------

Security Chief Shows Whistleblower Support

Lawmaker Admonishes Top TSA Administrator

Wednesday, October 17, 2007
BY RON MARSICO
Star-Ledger Staff

WASHINGTON -- Under intense grilling from a member of Congress, the head of the U.S. Transportation Security Administration yesterday said agency employees who disclose security problems at the nation's airports should be protected from retaliation by their bosses.

TSA Administrator Kip Hawley insisted his agency encourages its employees to come forward about problems, despite sharp skepticism from Rep. William Pascrell (D-8th Dist.), who said a history of TSA retaliation against its employees showed a need for stronger protections.

The congressman questioned Hawley at a hearing of the House Homeland Security Committee's subcommittee on transportation security, citing cases outlined this weekend in The Sunday Star-Ledger.

Hawley stopped short of endorsing pending legislation that would extend protections under the federal Whistleblower Protection Act to the nation's 43,000 checkpoint and baggage screeners. Currently, they have only limited protections.

"We need to be open and transparent with our work force about our vulnerabilities," said Hawley, who has headed TSA since mid-2005. "Workplace intimidation ... is a sickness, a vulnerability that has to be stopped."

But Pascrell chided Hawley, growing frustrated as the TSA chief pronounced himself unfamiliar with the details of specific cases Pascrell asked about, including a Las Vegas air marshal fired in 2006 for alerting the media to a cost-saving directive that would have reduced the number of marshals on cross-country flights.

"Get familiar with these cases and get back to us. ... This is unacceptable," Pascrell said. "You're supposed to know these things."

Although Pascrell peppered the TSA chief, other members of the committee failed to jump in.

Pascrell also said he was unhappy the agency sent internal affairs agents to Newark Liberty International Airport in October 2006 in an unsuccessful effort to determine the sources of a story that screeners there missed 20 of 22 covert tests.

"The public needs to know, has a right to know what's going on in any airport in this country," Pascrell said. "Don't you agree with that?"

Hawley said he agreed on policy issues, but not test results that could show vulnerabilities at specific airports. He said that is "classified information" that brings the agency's response "into a different realm."

Asked by a reporter after the hearing whether he would seek a review of the cases listed by Pascrell, Hawley responded, "Of course." Pressed about what such a review would entail and how long it might take, Hawley did not respond and walked away.

Pascrell also asked Hawley about legislation by Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) to cover TSA's 43,000 baggage and checkpoint screeners under the federal Whistleblower Protection Act, while also strengthening limitations in the act itself.

TSA administrative staff, high-level officials and air marshals are covered by the act, while screeners have only limited protection through the U.S. Office of Special Counsel.

"Don't you think they should be protected?" Pascrell asked Hawley, referring to the screeners.

"Yes, no question. We have those protections today," Hawley said.

In an interview during a break prior to Pascrell's questioning, Hawley said TSA has made efforts to let its employees know they can disclose agency shortcomings, noting there are listings on its Web sites about how and to whom official reports may be made.

"You can't do this job if the work force is not trusting of the leadership team," Hawley said. "Chasing after leaks is not a productive activity."

But he said it was important to keep test results like those revealed at Newark Liberty secret. Each day, he said, some 2,500 covert tests are conducted at the nation's airports.

"It would indicate some vulnerability" to terrorists if the results become public, he said. "Our job is to attack the vulnerability before they do and close it."

Ron Marsico may be reached at rmarsico@starledger.com or (973) 392-7860.)
© 2007 The Star Ledger