Water Makes US Troops in Iraq Sick
The Associated Press
Sunday 09 March 2008

Washington - Dozens of U.S. troops in Iraq fell sick at bases using "unmonitored and potentially unsafe" water supplied by the military and a contractor once owned by Vice President Dick Cheney's former company, the Pentagon's internal watchdog says.
A report obtained by The Associated Press said soldiers experienced skin abscesses, cellulitis, skin infections, diarrhea and other illnesses after using discolored, smelly water for personal hygiene and laundry at five U.S. military sites in Iraq.
The Defense Department's inspector general's report, which could be released as early as Monday, found water quality problems between March 2004 and February 2006 at three sites run by contractor KBR Inc., and between January 2004 and December 2006 at two military-operated locations.
It was impossible to link the dirty water definitively to all the illnesses, according to the report. But it said KBR's water quality "was not maintained in accordance with field water sanitary standards" and the military-run sites "were not performing all required quality control tests."
The report said KBR took corrective steps and was providing adequate water quality by November 2006. But military units at the two sites they controlled were still failing to perform required quality control tests and maintain appropriate records by that time.
"Therefore, water suppliers exposed U.S. forces to unmonitored and potentially unsafe water," at the military sites by late 2006, the report said.
The problems did not extend to troops' drinking water, but rather to water used for washing, bathing, shaving and cleaning. Water used for hygiene and laundry must meet minimum safety standards under military regulations because of the potential for harmful exposure through the eyes, nose, mouth, cuts and wounds.
The KBR sites were Camp Ar Ramadi, Camp Q-West and Camp Victory. The military sites were Logistics Support Area Anaconda and Camp Ali.
The inspector general's study confirmed AP reports on the contaminated water in early 2006 and provided additional details on the scope of the problem at the Iraq bases. In January that year, interviews and internal company documents disclosed the problems at Ar Ramadi and showed that KBR employees could not get the company to inform base residents.
Halliburton Co., then KBR's parent company, disputed the allegations even though they were made by its own employees and documented in company e-mails. In March 2006, the AP obtained an internal Halliburton report that, in one instance, the company missed contamination that could have caused "mass sickness or death" at Ar Ramadi.
The report said the event at Ar Ramadi could have been prevented if KBR's reverse osmosis units on the site had been assembled, instead of relying on the military's water production facilities.
Halliburton is the oil services conglomerate that Cheney once led. Congressional Democrats long have complained that KBR has benefited from its former ties to Cheney.
KBR, responding to the inspector general's report, said its water treatment "has met or exceeded all applicable military and contract standards." The company took exception to many of the inspector general's assertions. "KBR's commitment to the safety of all of its employees remains unwavering," the company said in a statement to the AP.
KBR provided water treatment to U.S. troops under a large-scale defense contract that also included housing and food to soldiers in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Djbouti and Georgia.
The military has "taken the appropriate measures to correct the problem and ensure we provide the appropriate oversight of the system," said Navy Capt. James Graybeal of the U.S. Central Command, which oversees U.S. troops in the Middle East.
North Dakota Sen. Byron Dorgan, who has led Democratic inquiries into contracting abuses in Iraq, said the inspector general has backed up what those earlier hearings uncovered. "KBR was not doing its job" and U.S. forces had water that did not meet Army standards, Dorgan said.
"I think it's outrageous that KBR tried to deny that there was a problem, especially when it turned out that there were dozens of U.S. troops reporting water-related illnesses," he said.
The inspector general investigated the 2006 reports at Dorgan's request.
The inspector general's report said some troops noticed problems with the water. Between October 2004 and May 2005, troops at Camp Ar Ramadi said bathwater was discolored and had an unusual odor. The report said KBR failed to treat the nonpotable water and monitor water quality during the same period.
At Camp Q-West, KBR inappropriately delivered chlorinated wastewater for showers and latrines without informing military preventive medicine officials, the report said. "KBR did not monitor or record the quality of water at point-of-use containers before April 2006, even though the ... contract required the company to do so," the report added.
Medical records for troops at Camp Q-West indicated 38 cases of illnesses commonly attributed to problem water. These include skin abscesses, cellulitis, skin infections and diarrhea. Doctors diagnosed 24 of the cases in January and February 2006, the same period when medical officials warned of a rise in bacterial infections at the base.
In addition, military medical records - tied to no particular base in Iraq - showed 26 cases of food and waterborne diseases, including hepatitis, giardiasis and typhoid fever.
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GAO: Future Combat Systems network still more concept than reality
By Bob Brewin bbrewin@govexec.com March 10, 2008

The number of lines of software code the Army needs to develop for its Future Combat Systems program has tripled to 95.1 million lines since 2003, and "it is not yet clear if or when the information network, which is at the heart of the FCS concept, can be developed, built and demonstrated," the Government Accountability Office reported on Monday.
The Army tapped Boeing Co. and SAIC in 2002 as lead systems integrators to develop FCS, an ambitious project estimated to cost anywhere from $164 billion to more than $230 billion. The project's aim is to link manned and unmanned ground and air vehicles, sensor systems and military commanders in a complex network designed to allow soldiers to see and hit the enemy first, rather than relying on heavy armor to withstand attack.
That involves writing software and implementing technology to link the people, platforms, weapons and sensors together. The basic FCS Brigade Combat Team network will stitch together 5,000 nodes on more than 1,500 radios supporting multiple subnetworks connected by gateways with 3 million information exchange requirements. But GAO noted in the report GAO-08-409 that to date the Army and its contractors have only demonstrated basic network concepts, such as connections and exchange of information between a limited number of network nodes.
The Army is still stabilizing its requirements and hardware and software designs have not matured, GAO reported. The first major demonstration of the FCS network will take place in fiscal 2012, about a year before the Army plans to start low-rate initial production of FCS hardware, such as infantry and reconnaissance vehicles, cannons, mortars, and robotic air and ground vehicles.
Congress, in the fiscal 2008 Defense authorization measure, said it would not approve production of such hardware until the completion of a successful network test.
The Army told GAO that the sharp increase in the lines of code needed to run FCS systems stems from an underestimation of the amount of operating system software required. The report found that the Army, Boeing and SAIC contributed to code growth with "inaccurate software sizing estimates," and noted that the Institute for Defense Analyses has estimated that the growth in code will add $3 billion to the overall FCS development cost.
Lack of stable development requirements also contributed to an increase in the amount of code required, GAO said, reporting that four out of five of the FCS software developers it met with (out of a total of 14) reported that problems with requirements have resulted in functionality being deferred to future versions.
"Deferring work into the future means that the associated software code writing and testing will take place later than planned, meaning that more code will be written later and the associated functionality will not be testable until later," the report stated.
This, GAO said, "indicates that less functionality than planned has been delivered and that software estimates will only grow larger in future builds."
The basic architecture of the FCS network also could frustrate Army efforts to develop the battlefield networks at the core of the system, the GAO report said. Unlike commercial wireless systems in which every node is connected to the Internet by a single link, in FCS, most network nodes will not have direct access to the network.
Instead, each radio must act as a router, meaning it will pass voice, video and data traffic from its subscribers as well as other radios and their subscribers. This, GAO said, could lead to a situation in which all fixed capacity on the network is consumed for routing traffic between radios and nodes, and there is no capacity to transmit information.
The magnitude, size and complexity and of the network and software development required for FCS are "unprecedented" in the history of the Defense Department, GAO said. "Because the performance of the network and the success of the software effort are not assured," the report said, "decision-makers should allow for the possibility that full success will not be achieved.... it will be wise to keep alternative courses of action viable to guard against such an eventuality."
John Pike, a defense analyst and director of GlobalSecurity.org, said that the Army should restructure FCS, backing away from a grand plan of developing everything at once and taking an incremental approach. Pike said the Army also might need to scale back the scope of FCS to focus on what it needs rather than what it desires.
Philip Coyle, senior adviser with the Center for Defense Information, a security policy research organization in Washington, agreed, and said developing FCS piecemeal would be a better approach. Coyle also faulted the Army for outsourcing responsibility for FCS to Boeing and SAIC, saying "this does not put the Army in the position of a good customer."
Pike said FCS is yet another example of "the lead system integrator concept being oversold." But, he added, Defense cannot hold onto people with the capability to oversee projects such as FCS "when they can make more money in the private sector."

FBI Investigates Missing GOP Money
By Philip Shenon
The New York Times
Thursday 06 March 2008
Washington - Hundreds of thousands of dollars are missing and presumed stolen from the chief fund-raising arm of House Republicans, according to party officials who described the findings of emergency internal audits.
The financial records of the group, the National Republican Congressional Committee, may also have been falsified for several years, Republican officials said. The campaign committees of several Republican lawmakers may also have been victims of a scam that is now under criminal investigation by the F.B.I.
The audits were ordered after the abrupt departure several weeks ago of Christopher J. Ward, who had been treasurer of the committee. Lawmakers said that Mr. Ward, who served a similar role for dozens of individual members of Congress and their political committees, is the focus of the F.B.I.'s criminal investigation.
The committee has acknowledged publicly that it was aware of "irregularities in our financial audit process" and that it had called in the F.B.I. in February because "these irregularities may include fraud."
But until now the committee has not acknowledged that any money was missing from its bank accounts or that the financial irregularities might extend beyond the national committee to the campaign funds of individual Republican lawmakers who also worked with Mr. Ward, a longtime party operative.
The Republican officials said they could not discuss the details of their findings on the record because of the continuing criminal investigation.
A lawyer for Mr. Ward, Ronald C. Machen of the Wilmer Hale law firm in Washington, had no comment. A spokeswoman for the F.B.I.'s Washington field office acknowledged that the bureau had opened an investigation at the request of the Republican committee.
The F.B.I. investigation comes at an especially awkward time for House Republicans, who are struggling to raise money for Congressional races in November.
Their job has been made even more difficult by the large number of Republican lawmakers - more than two dozen from the House - who have announced their retirements, and by a series of unrelated criminal and ethics investigations of other Congressional Republicans.
Mr. Ward had been treasurer of the national Republican committee since 2003. He had also been a partner in a private campaign consulting firm, Political Compliance Services, that gained notice in the 2004 presidential campaign because of its work on behalf of Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, a group that ran advertisements that criticized the military record of Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, the Democratic presidential nominee.
Committee officials said that bookkeeping irregularities were discovered in January after the chairman of the panel's auditing committee, Representative Mike Conaway of Texas, a certified public accountant, repeatedly asked to meet with representatives of the audit firm that was supposed to be reviewing the committee's books.
"I just kept insisting that we meet with the auditors," Mr. Conaway said in an interview. "It finally came into my head, and as the circumstances unfolded, that no audit had been done."
He said that Mr. Ward had promised to set up a meeting with the auditors and scheduled the gathering in late January.
But 30 minutes before the scheduled meeting, committee officials said, Mr. Ward sent an e-mail message to colleagues announcing that, in fact, no audit had been done. The officials said the fund-raising committee had since determined that its books had not been audited since 2003 and that Mr. Ward had submitted a series of falsified audits. The committee then called in the F.B.I. It is not clear, lawmakers said, if any fees were paid to audit firms in recent years by the committee, or where that money ended up.
"This was a longtime trusted employee and there were no obvious signs that he was living beyond his means," Mr. Conaway said.
Mr. Conaway said that the many Republican lawmakers who used Mr. Ward for their campaign funds or for bookkeeping for their political action committees were now hurriedly reviewing their own books for evidence of missing money or other improprieties.
"If you were one of the members who had a relationship with him, you should go back through your records extensively to see if you were caught up," he said.
Committee officials said that at least two Republican lawmakers who were clients of Mr. Ward's had reported to the committee in recent weeks that they had also found discrepancies in their campaign accounts.
Representative Rodney Alexander, Republican of Louisiana, said he ended his ties to Mr. Ward in February after learning of the concerns at the national committee. "Until then, we hadn't seen anything to indicate there was a problem," Mr. Alexander said, adding that his bookkeepers had found no evidence of missing money or other wrongdoing.
Mr. Ward was named treasurer of the national Republican committee five years ago by Representative Thomas M. Reynolds of New York, who stepped down as the committee's chairman last year. Mr. Reynolds has found himself under attack on the campaign trail at home because of the reports of financial irregularities at the committee.
"Does Tom Reynolds ever accept responsibility for his poor leadership or does he just pass the buck?" asked John Gerken, campaign manager for Jon Powers, a Democrat who is challenging Mr. Reynolds.
Mr. Reynolds said in a statement that he and the national Republican committee were possible victims of "an elaborate scheme resulting in financial irregularities" by a "long-serving professional staff member," a reference to Mr. Ward. "At no time were there any red flags raised," the lawmaker said.
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National Whistleblower Center3238 P Street, NWWashington, D.C. 20007 Online at: www.whistleblowers.org OR www.whistleblowersblog.orgFOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT:Marshall D. Chriswell (202) 595-9947Stephen M. Kohn (202) 342-6980mc@whistleblowers.org

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEMARCH 13, 2008

INSPECTOR GENERAL: HIGH-RANKING FBI OFFICIALS APPROVED ILLEGAL SEARCHES

Washington, D.C. March 10, 2007. Today the Department of Justice Inspector General's office has released yet another report confirming that the highest ranking FBI counterterrorism officials violated the Patriot Act when authorizing warrantless searches of over 3000 phone numbers through the use of National Security Letters ("NSL"). These Letters, authorized under the Patriot Act, permit FBI managers to sign search warrants without judicial notification or approval.Buried on pages 129-30 of today's report, the Inspector General found:"More troubling, 11 blanket NSL's issued by [FBI] Headquarters officials in 2006 that sought telephone data on 3,860 telephone numbers did not comply with the Patriot Reauthorization Act requirements respecting these provisions, internal FBI policy, or both. We are concerned by the failure of senior Counterterrorism Division officials to comply with statutory requirements and internal policy regarding the issuance of NSL's and their failure to consult legal counsel." The officials who signed the National Security Letters include the two highest ranking FBI counterterrorism managers, the current Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism. Stephen M. Kohn, the President of the National Whistleblower Center, issued the following statements: "The FBI continues to make grave errors within its counterterrorism program. These mistakes threaten both individual civil liberties and national security. It is unacceptable that over six years after the 9/11 attacks the FBI still does not understand basic rules governing counterterrorism operations. The FBI and Department of Justice have refused to listen to internal whistleblowers who have documented numerous problems within the counterterrorism program which threaten the safety of every American. Although the Inspector General has again documented problems with the abuses of the NSLs, they have refused to order changes in basic FBI policies which caused the NSL violations."Mr. Kohn represents Bassem Youssef, the highest ranking Arab American FBI agent employed within the FBI's Counterterrorism Division. According to a report issued by the Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility, the FBI illegally retaliated against Mr. Youssef after he reported deficiencies in the counterterrorism program to Congress and the Director of the FBI. On January 12, 2008, Mr. Youssef addressed a convention of the American Library Association and explained how the lack of subject matter expertise within the FBI was the root cause of the FBI's NSL fiasco. · Click to view today's DOJ OIG Report -end---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Since 1988 the NWC has championed whistleblower protection. The NWC is currently supporting FBI Whistleblower Bassem Youssef, who has reported serious misconduct in the War on Terror, and the NWC is currently assisting Bunnatine Greenhouse (the former Army Corps of Engineers top contracting officer who opposed the no-bid multi billion dollar contracts awarded to Halliburton for the reconstruction of Iraq) For more information, please visit www.whistleblowers.org and www.whistleblowersblog.org.

I recently heard from Dr. Shirley Pigott, of Texas. Her story is very compelling and very tragic. Does anyone have any ideas that might help her. Read below to see what a nightmare she's been going through. GFS
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Affidavit


Regarding DPS charges against Shirley Pigott MD for evading arrest in Wharton County, Texas
September 29, 2007

I am a 59 yo female physician; I was en route to Houston Intercontinental Airport on Saturday, September 29, 2007, to attend the annual meeting of the American Academy of Family Physicians in Chicago. I was to meet Doug Curran MD, 2006 President of the Texas Academy of Family Physicians, to discuss a grievance. I have alleged that he retaliated against me by having me investigated for a trivial complaint by his longtime friend at the Texas Medical Board, Keith E Miller MD, who was Chairman of the TMB Disciplinary Process Review Committee.


See the TMB Public Disciplinary Order against me at: www.tmb.state.tx.us/news/press/2007/083007a.php


Because of Curran's illegal influence with the TMB, I have investigated the Texas Medical Board myself and uncovered countless abuses. Other Texas physicians and I called for a House investigation. The Subcommittee on Regulatory Agencies of the Appropriations Committee of the Texas House of Representatives held eleven hours of public hearings on October 23, 2007. The hearings may be viewed on the House Archives at: www.house.state.tx.us/fx/av/committee80/71023a02r.ram

My testimony is the very last one. Three more hearings concerning abuses of the TMB are scheduled for 2008, the first possibly in March.

Miller's Nurse Practitioner Bridget Yvette Hughes, Center, Texas, is under an April, 2007, non-disciplinary peer assistance agreement with the Texas Nursing Board, after she acknowledged over 50 forgeries of Schedule II Controlled Substances. Although each forgery is a felony, she has not been arrested. I have alleged that Executive Director Katherine Thomas RN of the Texas Nursing Board bypassed the usual disciplinary process of the TNB because of Keith Miller's illegal influence.

I have alleged that Texas Department of Public Safety Officers Rodney Mahan and Ron Fields of Center, Texas, have been influenced illegally by Keith Miller not to arrest Hughes. I have reported Mahan and Fields' failure to fulfill their duties as public servants to the DPS Director, Colonel Thomas A. Davis, Jr., and Assistant Director Lt. Colonel David McEathron. I have called for an investigation of Mahan and Fields by DPS Internal Affairs.

Nothing has been done about Hughes' egregious felonious behavior or the failures of Mahan and Fields. I have complained bitterly to my own Texas Representative Geanie Morrison and Texas Senator Glenn Hegar. Not only have they "reported me" to the Wharton County District Attorney, but their aides have accused me of having a "bad attitude". Because of the breakdown of our representative state government and abuse of power by the Texas Medical Board, Texas Nursing Board, and the Texas Department of Public Safety, and the failures of my own Texas Representative and Senator, I have complained bitterly to Governor Perry's office (Tony Gilman, the Governor's Assistant for Health issues, Brian Newby, another assistant, and Gabby Fuentes in the Appointment Office).
I and other Texas physicians have alleged criminal activities by Roberta Kalafut DO, President of the Texas Medical Board. She is under criminal investigation by the special prosecutions division of the Travis County District Attorney's Office under the direction of Matt Langan.

My husband of 40 years, Dale Pigott, considered the pressures of my arrest and pending felony trial, the unconstitutional seizure of my car, my four investigations by the Texas Medical Board (two of which I am under orders for and two of which are pending), and our $150,000+ losses to this date. He complained repeatedly that he was under more stress than he could bear. He committed suicide on January 6, 2008.
The events of September 29, 2007, and those subsequent must be proven to be unrelated to my exposure of possible criminal, unconstitutional, and/or discriminatory actions perpetrated and protected by Texas agencies and Texas public servants. Otherwise, I have been targeted for harassment by the Texas Department of Public Safety. The unrelenting stress due to the actions of DPS and the bad faith peer review I have experienced by the Texas Medical Board have resulted in my husband's suicide. While it is highly unlikely that either Ochoa or Terronez knew any of the preceding details, I believe they may have been responding to a directive to harass me. Ostensibly because of my 93 seconds of evading arrest in my Toyota Prius at high speeds, it was seized, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, by the Wharton City Police, and/or the Wharton District Attorney, and/or the Texas DPS as "contraband" used in the commission of a single alleged "felony".

My health and safety have been recklessly and intentionally endangered. I was almost killed by a speeding 18-wheeler as I "fled arrest" due to an abusive angry DPS officer (Terronez) using overwhelming force against me. Texas DPS Officer Daniel Terronez violated the Texas Penal Code repeatedly on September 29, 2007. My actions were exactly what I told him they would be if he tried to remove me forcibly from my vehicle. My husband has committed suicide after stating that the events in my life were causing him intolerable stress.

If there is any possibility that events surrounding my arrest have any relationship whatsoever, past or future, to supposedly unrelated events in the Texas Department of Public Safety in Center, Texas, and in other Texas agencies, such as the Texas Nursing Board and the Texas Medical Board, then an investigation at the highest level is in order.

The United States Drug Enforcement Administration has jurisdiction, because of Hughes' multiple forgeries of Schedule II Controlled Substances and the fact that no actions have been taken against her. Schedule II Controlled Substances are regulated by the DEA. Each forgery is a felony under federal law. This investigation must also involve the Federal Bureau of Investigation, because federal narcotic trafficking laws have been violated and two medical practitioners are being protected by the State of Texas and its Agencies.
Hughes' "supervising physician", Keith E Miller MD, at best, knowingly failed to supervise her appropriately. He hired her knowing the circumstances of her dismissal from Center physician Craig McMullen MD. Miller also was aware of McMullen's reports to the Texas Nursing Board and the Texas Department of Public Safety. Miller was, presumably, unconcerned about repercussions from these state agencies.
These are sufficient grounds for permanent revocation of Miller's medical license based on standards he has applied to other Texas physicians.

If the more likely scenario is true, Miller is aiding and abetting Hughes in her felonious actions. Hughes has admitted to intemperate use of narcotics. Due to the volume of forgeries, it is much more likely Hughes has been dealing. There are multiple persons and state agencies who know these details and can verify them: Craig McMullen MD of Center, individuals on the Texas Nursing Board, Texas Medical Board, Texas Department of Public Safety, pharmacist Gordon duPre at WalMart in Center, Center Police Chief Walter Shofner, Shelby County Sheriff Newton Johnson, and a nurse investigator at the Texas Nursing Board who resigned from the TNB within a few days of confirming she knew what I have recorded about Hughes.

Those responsible for enforcing the laws refuse to take action to protect the public. Hughes is a clear danger to the public. Officials at the highest levels of Texas state government are aware of my allegations, but deny them. My Administrative Assistant, Tammy Hercheck, made an appointment with Hughes for March 4, 2008 at 1:30 pm, under the name Lori Adair, to have a "female exam."


Events of September 29, 2007

At 8:15 pm, I was stopped by Texas Department of Public Safety Officer Freddie Ochoa (identified later) for going 74 mph in a 65 mph zone of four-lane US Highway 59 between the small communities of El Campo and Wharton, Texas. The road is dangerous, heavily traveled, and known for its drug traffic from Mexico to Houston; it was already completely dark.

An hour earlier, the speed limit had been 70 mph.

When I first heard the trooper and saw his lights flashing, his vehicle was a single car length behind me, in the left lane, also going 74 mph. I was startled by the sudden noise, lights, and the close proximity of his car to mine. Another vehicle blocked me on the right side, so I activated my flashers, pulled off the road on the left, well into the median, and stopped.. I listened to my CD while I waited for the officer to approach me.


From this point, the incident is recorded on DPS video, and is available for viewing.

When he didn't appear, I turned off the CD and heard him shouting at me with a bullhorn, "Driver, when it is safe to do so, cross to the right side of the road." There were approximately 12 vehicles passing me per minute (counted), an estimated 3 - 4 of them were 18-wheelers. He told me to cross, then not to cross, then to cross, depending on whether or not there was any pause in the heavy traffic.

As a physician, I am trained to determine what is safe and what is not safe. In my judgment it was not safe to cross this busy highway in the dark, so I remained in my car. The officer continued to shout for about two more minutes, then drove up behind me and parked.
I locked my doors and windows.

Subsequent times are based on the moment Ochoa approached.

00:00 minutes/seconds: When Ochoa arrived at my car on the driver's side, I held my drivers' license to the window for him to examine. He refused, but shouted for me to roll down my window and open the door. He had his face in my window, so there were no difficulties whatever in my hearing him or his hearing me. Within 17 seconds of his first words, he threatened to arrest me. I became greatly alarmed and attempted five calls to my husband on my cell phone. However, the officer had stopped me in an area so desolate there was no cell phone service.

Victoria attorney David Smith has a picture of my cell phone record, showing the calls.

I asked Ochoa to identify himself, but he refused. I was able to see that he had on a name tag, even though he was turned so I could not read it.
There were no lighted residences or businesses within miles in any direction. This is confirmed by the video of the "chase".

I asked Ochoa to call another officer, who I hoped would be more reassuring, or to follow me on to Wharton where other people would be present. Ochoa again refused. I pleaded with him again to follow me to Wharton. I am aware of standard procedures in the event a female driver is stopped in an isolated area by an officer who is not reassuring. I followed them to the letter. The news media have reported criminals/rapists posing as police officers; even more common are reports of angry police officers physically abusing victims.

00:49 seconds Forty-nine seconds after his first words to me, (on the recorded DPS video) Ochoa yelled excitedly, "If you leave, I will charge you with evading!" I had merely asked him one more time to follow me to Wharton.
As he repeatedly threatened me, he was obviously becoming agitated, so I sounded my horn to attract the attention of passing motorists. No one stopped to help.

04:00 minutes: Becoming frantic, I insisted Ochoa follow me to Wharton. I had my flashers on continuously, and I sounded my horn again. I accelerated to 40 mph, made sure the officer was following, and eased my way onto the left lane of the highway. With my horn and flashers I was trying to signal to fellow travelers that I was in an emergency situation.

07:00 minutes: The second officer (later identified as Daniel Terronez) arrived while I was driving toward Wharton with Ochoa following. Terronez pulled me over to the right. He was in an old unmarked car with a grainy burgundy paint job; his flashing lights were inside his car. His uniform was disheveled, hair mussed, and he wore no hat. He appeared to have been aroused from sleep.

Terronez seemed to need an explanation for Ochoa's stop. Ochoa embarrassingly explained with pressured speech, "She's been doing this all the time". (Doing what all the time?!?) "She was speeding! Going 65 in a 74 mph [sic]!" "She pulled over" (gasp!) "to the left!!" He neglected to mention that I was driving in the left lane and a car was blocking the right lane. "She almost caused a wreck!" "...she's not all there!"

Initially Terronez was not especially threatening, but Ochoa's incessant chatter got him worked up.

In response to my requests for identification, Terronez actually turned away from me and faced oncoming traffic, hiding his pocket where the name tag was supposed to be. He turned away so quickly that I think he didn't want me to see that he was not wearing a name tag.

He became enraged, apparently in response to Ochoa, and began threatening me repeatedly with breaking in my car window, implying that he would remove me forcibly. Every time he threatened me, I told him I would drive on to Wharton where other people would be around. I emphatically insisted I would immediately leave if he tried to break in. This exchange happened multiple times. There is no doubt he knew exactly what I would do the moment he resorted to violence.

"Do you want me to break the window? Do you want me to break the window? Huh?"
"I'm going to break the window!" "I'm going to break the window!"
"Roll the window down so I can talk to you at least." (Sure I will...)

The reason I did not roll down the window "a little bit" was that pressing the electronic button even slightly often prompted the mechanism to roll the window down completely. I knew I would then be vulnerable to physical attack by this officer who had not ceased to breathe threats against me.

"Roll the window down a little bit." "Roll the window down a little bit, Ma'am." "Roll the window down a little bit."
"Roll the window; I can't hear you." "Roll the window; I can't hear you."

Funny he couldn't hear me; I could hear him quite clearly. Otherwise, how could I have responded repeatedly that I would leave the instant he began to break in?
"Roll the window down." Horn blasts. "Roll the window down." Horn blasts. "...the fire department.." Horn blasting.

07:53 minutes: Officer Terronez goes to his car, gets in, and backs up, with the obvious intent to wedge me in.
08:31 minutes: Ochoa: "Stop! You're going to cause a [sic] accident! What are you doing?!?" I realigned myself at a 45 degree angle from the highway.
09:16 minutes: Officer Terronez walks to the right rear of my car and begins bashing the window in with his heavy flashlight. This is no emergency according to the Texas Penal Code. According to the Texas Penal Code, he is using overwhelming force.
09:18 minutes: Terronez continues his violent attack. I haltingly start off..

09:19 minutes: Ochoa: "Stop! There's traffic coming!" Terronez continues to bash in my right rear window violently.
09:21 minutes: I pull out onto the highway, moving faster. Terronez does not even pause, although he is facing oncoming traffic, and should have seen the rapidly approaching 18-wheeler barreling down upon us - particularly because Ochoa was screaming about it.
09:30 minutes: Seeing the 18-wheeler, Ochoa yells a side-splitting exclamation: "THERE'S TRAFFIC COMING!!! YOU'RE GOING TO GET RUN OVER!!!"

09:45 minutes: Terronez does not even pause. On the contrary, the video shows him running after my car striking it violently, forcing me to flee as I told him I would!
09:49 minutes: I stomp on the accelerator and almost collide with the monster truck I had not seen nor heard. If the driver had not swerved left (without slowing) and I had not swerved right, I would have been obliterated by a semi-truck hurtling down the highway at 70 mph. My children would now be orphans. As I quickly accelerate, the truck can be seen on the video flying by. The Doppler sound effect confirms its top speed. When I reach 107 mph, the car smells like it's burning so I go no faster. I continue at 107 mph for 93 seconds until I see a place that may be open for business. I slow down and see that it's not.
11:22 minutes: I accelerate back up to 55 mph until I'm inside the Wharton City Limits and see other law enforcement officers waiting as I had originally requested.

15:12 minutes: I pull over beyond the parked patrol cars and wait for the officers. To my dismay, officer Ochoa and Terronez are the ones who approach me again. I requested for one of the new officers to question me. I wait for the other officers to gather around, then get out.

The Texas DPS video continues.

Officers Ochoa and Terronez did become more relaxed and professional around the other officers.

I am booked for evading arrest. DPS officers acknowledge "spiking" someone else's car!

I was taken to the Wharton County Hospital for a blood alcohol level. Neither the phlebotomist there nor the DPS officer knew if cleansing my skin with isopropyl alcohol prior to drawing my blood would interfere with the blood ethanol level (it wouldn't), so she attempted to draw my blood under non-sterile conditions! The phlebotomist appeared surprised when I insisted that she at minimum should cleanse my skin with warm soapy water.. I told her I was a doctor. She became disconcerted with that piece of information, but Officer Ochoa, who heard me clearly, showed no acknowledgment at all. He didn't even flinch.
Because my regular medications include Concerta, a long-acting methyphenidate, I requested to have a urine toxic screen, my own blood alcohol, and to see the ER doctor. Initially I was refused. However, I warned Ochoa several times of the difficulties he might face if he denied me medical care.

Ochoa began driving the back country roads without any explanation; he could see I was becoming more alarmed moment by moment. Finally, he admitted he was taking me to the El Campo ER. There I saw the ER doctor at my own expense, had my blood alcohol drawn (the phlebotomist cleansed my arm with a pledget of isopropyl alcohol) and a specimen taken for urine toxicology testing. The results of both were negative. I am still waiting for the results of the DPS ethanol level.

The ER doctor tried to soothe my fears, but at midnight my BP was 162/106 and my pulse was 134 according to the digital monitor. I asked the ER doctor to note a superficial abrasion on my right forearm and the edema and contusions on both wrists where Officer Ochoa had handcuffed me so tightly. I was concerned that the abnormal VS I saw would not be recorded and asked the nurse to do so. She reported that the entire tracing would be part of the medical record.

My Victoria cardiologist, Bill Campbell MD, whom I see occasionally for high cholesterol identified my condition as an "adrenergic crisis" which could have just as easily snuffed out my life by a heart attack or stroke as an 18-wheeler crashing into my car.
My trial for "evading arrest" is pending. When I asked for help from my State Representative Geanie Morrison and State Senator Glenn Hegar, they refused to talk to me themselves, but their staff reported me to DPS, who reported me to the Wharton County DA. The DA contacted my attorney, David Benning Smith. Smith's partner, Dexter Eaves, lost the most recent election in Victoria County for District Attorney. He has further political ambitions. Smith "instructed" me not to contact Morrison or Hegar again; Eaves told me, "We have our reputation to protect."

Prior to his suicide on January 6, 2008, my husband paid the firm of Eaves, Bauknight, and Smith $15,000 without my authorization, advice, or consent to recover my car and defend me against the felony charges. Rather than make any attempt to have my car returned, Smith told me I would not be able to see the DPS video until trial. A California physician friend of mine, Gil Mileikowsky MD, asked his friend Clark Baker, a retired LAPD Detective, to get a copy of the DPS video. Baker had it within 48 hours.


VIOLATION OF BOARD RULES*** www.tmb.state.tx.us/news/press/2007/083007a.php

PIGOTT, SHIRLEY P., M.D., VICTORIA, TX, Lic. #F7054
On August 24, 2007, the Board and Dr. Pigott entered into a Mediated Agreed Order requiring that Dr. Pigott obtain 10 hours of CME in the area of medical record keeping, that she submit written office policies relating to the office's practice and procedure for managing requests for medical records and lab reports, and that she pay an administrative penalty of $500. The action was based on Dr. Pigott's failure to timely release certain lab tests to a single patient.

My signature affirms that I believe the above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge


______________________________________ ___________________
Shirley Pigott MD February 27, 2008


Notary Stamp, Signature, and Date: THIS HAS BEEN NOTARIZED AND IS NOW SWORN TESTIMONY