Last Inspector's Blog - Fighting FAA & Boeing Fraud from the 737 to the 787
Alert From the Project On Government Oversight Supporting their Op-Ed in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer
Monday, May 12, 2008, 12:14 AM
Posted by Administrator (www.thelastinspector.com)

If you thought the last blog was noteworthy, check out this alert on the Project On Government Oversight's website, which gives facts and data backing up their op-ed in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer that showed that Boeing and the FAA knew my report on massive rollerstamping fraud by BCA inspectors was correct. Yet over the years they knew it was the status quo at BCA they did nothing about this fraud allowing defects of unknown number and severity to deliver to airline and government customers. In fact, the STA (Special Technical Audit) of BCA in 1999/2000 was actually used to further weaken an already ineffective quality system, rather than to make it more effective, as an reasonable person would deduce was what was needed.

This effort to weaken and make "less prescriptive" Boeing's already sievelike quality system was called the "Quality Management System," or QMS. Why would Boeing further weaken such a compromised quality assurance department as documented in the STA? Because, of course, as noted on my website, Boeing management was always aware rollerstamping was going on on a massive scale in QA because it was Boeing management who wanted that fraud to take place for cost and production flow reasons. And they knew they could count on their counterparts in the FAA to look the other way.

In January, 2002, I began my effort to end the rollerstamping in Boeing QA after my manager of the time proved to me it was Boeing management directed fraud, by going to the FAA. After several rounds of trying to get the FAA and Boeing Headquarters management to end that fraud placing passenger and crew lives at extra risk for a few more bottom line dollars for Boeing, Boeing dared me to go public, knowing they had FAA management to cover for their continuing fraud. The FAA had reliably done so since at least the 1999 STA.

That's where the "Dual Failures" charade came in, which began, not coincidentally, just after I last spoke with Boeing about the subject, in October, 2003. This was a cover for Both FAA and Boeing management should I go public, as they and I expected I would. However, due to aforesaid reasons, I was unable to do so in a timely manner. They thought that I had decided to not go public after all, so they dropped this "Dual Failures" cover up project. More proof of Boeing/FAA management complicity in ensuring the rollerstamping quality system at BCA can continue. What more proof does DOT OIG Inspector General Scovel need to investigate the crooks in the FAA "overseeing" Boeing Type and Production Certificates? You have to wonder at what point they will step up and do their jobs in this critical area. Corrupt FAA mmanagement are not going to out themselves. Real oversight of BCA is needed now that will not only restore Boeing's quality system to minimum standards, but also restore Boeing's and/or the FAA's oversight of Boeing supplier's compliance with minimum quality system standards, which the OIG has documented serious noncompliances with. The root causes of both are the same--corrupt BCA and FAA management.

http://www.pogo.org/p/transportation/ta-080508-faa.html

Alert

May 8, 2008

Internal Boeing Documents Support Whistleblower's Allegations: Aircraft Quality Control Problems Cited

For Immediate Release
Contact Nick Schwellenbach (202) 347-1122

Internal Boeing documents obtained by the Project On Government Oversight show that the allegations of a former Boeing quality control inspector facing criminal charges have merit. Quality control problems at Boeing increase the likelihood that defective aircraft parts end up on planes and flaws in the manufacturing of planes remain uncorrected. This can potentially threaten public safety and drive up the cost of aircraft maintenance. These documents are linked at the bottom of this release.

Gerald Eastman, the former Boeing inspector, is facing a second trial of criminal charges for disclosing Boeing information to the press. His first trial last month resulted in a mistrial when jurors could not agree on whether Eastman committed "computer trespass." Mr. Eastman claims that his involvement with the press stemmed from the lack of corrective actions taken by Boeing and the government in response to his disclosures of wrongdoing to them.

An internal Boeing memo sent to Boeing employees in October 2000 stated that misuse of "production stamps" or "roller-stamping" can result in negative consequences for the company and the individual misusing their stamp. Roller-stamping is the misuse of production stamps to stamp work on critical parts and assemblies as complete and fully inspected when there has only been a cursory inspection, if one at all, of the part or assembly in question. Eastman's central claim is that he had perceived widespread "roller-stamping" and Boeing did little to curtail the practice.

"These documents show that Eastman clearly had a reasonable basis for his belief roller-stamping was occurring," according to Nick Schwellenbach, POGO investigator. "It's one thing to break company policy on releasing documents and getting fired, it's another matter to file criminal charges. Who do the prosecutors work for?"

The Boeing memo came months after the Federal Aviation Agency conducted a special technical audit of Boeing that concluded that there were systemic quality control problems. The 2000 FAA special technical audit found "in some cases, manufacturing planning was not adequate, requirements were not followed, inspections were not specific, or personnel were not knowledgeable about requirements." Thus, "parts, assemblies, and installations are released through the system that do not conform" to approved designs. Also, in 2000, the FAA proposed "a record $1.24 million in civil penalties against Boeing for inadequate supplier oversight and for failing to quickly report cracked parts on two older jetliners," according to a news report (James Wallace, "FAA Audit Rips Boeing Over 100 Production, Design Problems Detailed; Company Plans Corrective Action," Seattle Post-Intelligencer, August 11, 2000.).

Years later, roller-stamping was still occurring when Eastman acted on his concerns.

Boeing certainly was aware of the practice because a Boeing document dated January 2004, states that, "There appears to be a systemic issue within BCA [Boeing Commercial Aircraft] involving parallel process breakdowns of mechanics and inspectors involved in assembling and inspecting aircraft, assemblies and parts." The 2004 document also states that the FAA examined 55 issues at Boeing between 2002 and 2003 and found that "24% of these issues have involved instances where the mechanic and inspector created and accepted nonconforming conditions"—i.e. roller-stamping.

In further support of Eastman's claims, other Boeing employees became whistleblowers when they reported that Boeing supplier Ducommun was regularly supplying non-conforming parts to Boeing, according to the whistleblowers' False Claims Act lawsuit obtained by POGO. Now-former Boeing employees Taylor Smith, Jeannine Prewitt and James Ailes were then retaliated against by management because Boeing allegedly did not want to deal with the repercussions of their findings.

For additional information

Boeing Commercial Airplane Group memorandum, " Use of personal stamps in our production system ," October 31, 2000.

Federal Aviation Administration, " Special Technical Audit of Boeing Commercial Airplane Group ," December 1, 1999, through February 11, 2000.

Boeing Airplane Program Systemic Issues Chartered Team 1, " Investigation of 'Dual Failures ,'" January 2004.

United States of America ex rel Taylor Smith, Jeannine Prewitt and James Ailes vs. The Boeing Company and Ducommun, Inc. , Federal District Court of Kansas. Filed on March 11, 2005.

Founded in 1981, the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) is an independent nonprofit that investigates and exposes corruption and other misconduct in order to achieve a more accountable federal government.

From: http://www.fedhallofshame.com/?p=317
Boeing Whistleblower Gerald Eastman
Posted in May 12th, 2008
by C. Yee in Accountability, Current Events, Whistleblowers

Picture not only being terminated from your job for whistleblowing, but being charged with computer trespass and arrested too. It happened to ex-Boeing employee, Gerald Eastman.

Here’s a link to an April 7 article from the Seattle Post-Intelligencer about Eastman’s first court ordeal, which ended in a mistrial. The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) also blogged about Eastman’s disclosures, writing:
Internal Boeing documents obtained by the Project On Government Oversight show that the allegations of a former Boeing quality control inspector facing criminal charges have merit. Quality control problems at Boeing increase the likelihood that defective aircraft parts end up on planes and flaws in the manufacturing of planes remain uncorrected. This can potentially threaten public safety and drive up the cost of aircraft maintenance.

Gerald Eastman, the former Boeing inspector, is facing a second trial of criminal charges for disclosing Boeing information to the press. His first trial last month resulted in a mistrial when jurors could not agree on whether Eastman committed “computer trespass.” Mr. Eastman claims that his involvement with the press stemmed from the lack of corrective actions taken by Boeing and the government in response to his disclosures of wrongdoing to them.

The rest of POGO’s post can be found here. As POGO notes, if Mr. Eastman is found guilty, it could set a terrible precedent for not just aviation safety, but public safety in general. Mr. Eastman is set to return to King County (WA) Municipal Court again next week.

2 users commented in " Boeing Whistleblower Gerald Eastman "
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RLK said,
in May 12th, 2008 at 7:34 pm
Boeing is a criminal enterprise;
RICCO Act–”When three or more parties conspire to carry on an on going criminal enterprise, it can fall under the “RICCO Act.
Boeing should be barred from Gov’t contracts for a year.

Jim said,
in May 12th, 2008 at 8:05 pm
It won’t happen. Once Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas, they eliminated the competition. Besides, where would all those SESers and Generals go to work after retiring from Govt. service?

Amusing - GFS
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Boeing on Broadway? No, "Boeing Boeing"
By Rami Grunbaum, deputy business editor, and Times business Staff


LONGACRE THEATER
A promotional poster for the current Broadway production of the 1960s bedroom comedy "Boeing Boeing."
A wacky bedroom farce that opened last Sunday on Broadway puts the name of Puget Sound's largest employer up in lights — twice over.
"Boeing Boeing" is no product-placement gimmick, though. It's the hit revival of a 1960s French play whose improbable plot takes off when airlines shift to a new generation of faster planes.
The original show enjoyed huge success in Europe, but flopped in the U.S. after just 23 performances. A forgettable movie version with Tony Curtis and Jerry Lewis was advertised as "the big comedy of nineteen-sexty-sex."
The last time a company name got such prominent billing on stage or screen was probably the stoner comedy flick "Harold & Kumar Go to White Castle." And the last time the words "Boeing" and "sex" shared headlines, a CEO lost his job. But never mind that.
Some trademark watchdogs would take umbrage, or legal action, if the corporate name were hijacked by Broadway. Imagine the lawyers circling a production called "Starbucks Starbucks."
But Boeing's vice president of brand and market positioning, Rob Pollack, sees no downside.
"It's kind of fun; it doesn't talk about airplanes very much," he says. "From a branding standpoint I don't have any problem with it. It's a lot better than 'Airbus Airbus.' "
Not that Airbus was around when Marc Camoletti concocted the premise of the piece: An American in Paris who is carefully juggling simultaneous engagements to three stewardesses.
All is well so long as each of them travels for days at a time, working on the slow-flying 707. But the playboy's arrangements start to unravel with the debut of speedier jets from Boeing and others.
Judging by the buzz for the current production, it could be headed for a Tony nomination next week. That would help keep "Boeing Boeing" aloft a lot longer this time around.

Now this is interesting and not very surprising. In fact, I was wondering when this would occur. With all of the moving of composite materials and parts manufacturing to China and other countries outside of the U.S. and the many instances of espionage, some of which have been noticed, challenged and the culprits arrested and prosecuted, it seemed only a matter of time before China would be moving into its desired role as competitor to Boeing and Airbus, not just a source of cheap labor and supply for the big two. Somehow certain U.S. companies appear to just keep shooting themselves in the foot, and taking our economy and everyone else along with them. GFS
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China launches homegrown jumbo jet manufacturing company
The Associated Press
China established a homegrown company Sunday to make passenger jumbo jets - a step forward in the country's quest to become less dependent on Boeing and Airbus.
China Commercial Aircraft Co. was established in Shanghai with registered capital of 19 billion yuan (US$2.7 billion; euro1.75 billion), the official Xinhua News Agency and state broadcaster CCTV said.
Europe's Airbus has forecast that China's domestic aircraft market will increase fivefold by 2026. Airbus and Chicago-based rival Boeing dominate the market for commercial airplanes carrying 100 or more people.
Xinhua said China Commercial Aircraft Co. will be able to make planes with more than 150 seats.
The central government and the Shanghai government are among the major shareholders, as are China's two main aircraft manufacturing and servicing companies, China Aviation Industry Corp. I and China Aviation Industry Corp. II, which were split off from state-owned China Aviation Industry Corp. in 1999.
The state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission committed 6 billion yuan (US$86 million; euro55.6 million), making it the largest investor.
Given China's limited experience with making commercial airliners, manufacturing jumbo jets would be a significant achievement. China's first commercial jet, a 85-seater developed by China Aviation Industry Corp. I, had its maiden flight postponed last month until later in the year because of delays in the delivery of key components.
China Commercial Aircraft general manager Jin Zhuanglong said in a Xinhua interview that it was too early to say when a Chinese-developed jumbo jet would be taking off, as it would take a long time to develop talent and conduct research.
"According to the development history of Airbus and Boeing, the development and success of civil planes cannot be realized by relying on one or two generations," he was quoted as saying.
China welcomes cooperation with foreign companies and will make full use of foreign technology in developing its aircraft, Xinhua quoted him as saying.
The company's short-term goal is to help market the 85-seat ARJ21, he said.
Chinese carriers have already ordered 181 of the planes. A memorandum of understanding has been signed with GE Capital Aviation Services on a possible order for five jets, which would be the first sale to a major foreign company.

Someone who was doing some research on the Internet sent this article to me today. The reader found it and thought it did a good job of clarifying the problem of why Boeing and perhaps some other defense contractors do not appear to be willing to clean up their acts. I am interested in how Boeing has allegedly co-opted the FAA and others regarding safety practices. It is an interesting and plausible scenario that if Boeing has operated this way with commercial aircraft manufacturing and business, it likely has used it’s influence through the intense lobbying efforts it uses at all levels of government, and availed itself of the very active Revolving Door between Boeing and governmental agencies, particularly DOD and agencies with oversight responsibilities, to reduce or in some cases eliminate requirements Boeing finds inconvenient, too expensive, or gets in the way of certain people’s ambitious plans. Read and think on it. GFS

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Why Boeing will never reform itself and end the fraud noted on this site willingly:

After reading this site's contents you might well be baffled as to why Boeing continues to risk another "Druyun/EELV affair" (although this fraud is many times worse than those matters) and continues to also willingly place at greater risk the lives of the public that fly on Boeing jets because of Boeing's acceptance of greater "business risk" by the hobbling of Quality, Safety, and Reliability ensuring practices that has placed the vast majority of this extra "Boeing business" risk not on Boeing itself, but on the lives of those passengers and crew who unknowingly (unless they stumble across this site) bear such extra risk solely for Boeing's quest for ever greater Bottom line value and for whatever part of this "value" gets deducted from Boeing airplane prices and therefore "benefits" airlines (until the inevitable hull loss accident because of this fraud).

The first sign that Boeing does not intend to end this obvious fraud willingly has been proven by Boeing's actions in my attempts to bring this fraud to their attention in damning detail on multiple occasions. On those occasions Boeing's actions were just "CYA" extremely limited and biased internal audits that may have made an uninformed person think Boeing had done something, when in fact those audits changed nothing noticeably to end this fraud in order to ensure the "benefits" of the noted fraud continued to add to meeting Boeing's all-important bottom line maximization goals.

Boeing's similar and purposeful inaction to end this endemic fraud within the company placing innocent lives at extra risk intentionally for more bottom line dollars after I "broke the story" publicly on this site and in the news media also proves Boeing's inability to take action themselves to reverse this fraud the company has been willingly fostering for years, no matter how public these crimes ultimately become.The most powerful motive for Boeing to resist internal reforms seemingly regardless of the consequences is not because of its (by one highly placed management source within the company) self-described status as "the most arrogant company on the face of the planet." It instead comes to what everything is about at Boeing--the almighty dollar.

Boeing is one of the most business plan driven companies in existence. Anything that does not support reaching the business plan's "targets" is in jeopardy, even if legally and regulatory required, such as Boeing's compliance with its Production and Type Certificates goes. This explains not only why Boeing intentionally subverted and intentionally did not comply with its minimum quality system and certification requirements as documented on this site--it also explains why Boeing will willingly do nothing to reverse the "gains" to the business plan made by this fraud.

To reverse this fraud would be much more difficult for Boeing than the actions it had to take to put these fraudulent activities in place. Years of QA manager's (and their manager's) and complicit QA Lead's (now "Team Leaders") efforts to turn inspectors into mostly just rollerstampers of paperwork would have to be reversed--not an easy or short time span task. Most of the time "leaned out" of production line flow to enable shorter flowtimes and moving lines was time for inspectors to actually inspect the airplanes, which was not necessary in the rollerstamping quality system put in place by Boeing.

However, complying with Production Certificate requirements to have inspectors actually inspect per quality system requirements would require much of that time to be added back into the production schedule and/or an unprecedented number of inspectors per mechanic ratio than that of the past. Boeing will not take these actions willingly due to their cost (effect on meeting the business plan) and the effect on flowtimes. Indeed, because of the above, I don't expect Boeing to ever admit any of the corruption I have documented on this site and elsewhere, because to do so would require Boeing to take some action to stop it, which it does not want to do for the aforesaid reasons, among others (effect on their undeserved reputation, etc.)

But if Boeing does fess up to some of these past and present crimes (which will probably happen only because they would calculate greater risks to the company's bottom line if they did not do so, such as ignoring the results of the ongoing review by the DOT OIG might ultimately bring the company), don't even then expect Boeing to end this corruption. Just like after the Special Technical Audit of 1999/2000 where they were "caught with their pants down" "violating" many of even of the most basic requirements of the FAA, expect Boeing only to do the minimum they think they can get away with as far as reform until the "problems" (the auditors) go away and Boeing can then do business again as usual. Also expect another tactic used by Boeing during "C/A" after the STA, implementing programs (with the tacit approval of a similarly corrupt FAA) that actually made compliance with its quality system much worse than before the STA, and indeed, in some cases, eliminated unjustifiably the requirements Boeing had violated, rather than Boeing ever complying with those "burdensome" requirements that were in place to ensure quality, safety, and reliability requirements were met, but were "too prescriptive" and therefore had to go to meet Boeing's overriding goal of enhancing efficiency over everything, including safety.

From: www/thelastinspector.com