Thoughts on Seth Hettena’s
Feasting on the Spoils: The Life and Times
of Randy “Duke” Cunningham,
History’s Most Corrupt Congressman.

In case any of you reading this have been part of the crowd doubting the pressure many federal employees have had put on them by the wrongdoers both within their government offices and those in industry outside the government, consider that although threats on a person’s life may not be the norm, certainly, threats to destroy the career and/or take away employment and therefore that which provides a living are.

Mr. Hettena describes in Chapter 7, “Fat Fingers,” incidents in which insinuations were made that if certain federal employees did not dance to the demanded tune, they might suffer permanent silencing.

Here are some excerpts from Feasting on the Spoils. This one refers to contract work in Panama assigned to Brent Wilkes company, ADCS (automated document conversion system).

“A few days before a trip to Panama in March in 1999, Gary Jones, the Pentagon official overseeing the document-scanning program, came home from work to find his wife looking shocked and ashen-faced. “I just got a phone call that said that ‘you need to tell your husband to watch his back while he’s in Panama,’” Jones’s wife told him. Before leaving, Jones wrote down a whole bunch of names and put them in an envelope and told his wife that if anything happened to him while he was gone, she should open the envelope and get hold of the people whose names he had listed.”

Later while in Panama, Jones found himself further disturbed by a continuation of not very veiled threats:

“At dinner, Jones was seated next to a man he didn’t know. “You know,” the man told Jones, “I don’t know if you’re aware of this, but we have ways to keep people from ever leaving Panama. No one would ever know where they went.”

Jones was reportedly quite disconcerted and held himself hostage in his hotel room any time he was not in meetings, too frightened to go out, stating he’d worked for the government thirty-two years and never experienced anything as ugly as this before.

Another government official, Paul Behrens who also flew to Panama to inspect ADCS’s work, also had an unsettling experience:

“He was met at the airport by Wilkes and his entourage. As they walked out of the airport, Behrens heard Wilkes say, apropos of nothing, ‘Boy, you guys know that people can just disappear in foreign countries?’ Behrens took it as a clear threat, and he relayed the remark to the Defense Inspector General’s Office and the Army’s Criminal Investigative Division, but was told that no action could be taken since it did not constitute a ‘specific threat.’ ”

I have had incidents brought to my attention by “whistleblowers” (or more accurately, federal employees (or even sometimes contractor employees) trying to stand up to wrongdoing), even here in the states brought about by certain overzealous and ambitious contractors which serve as further examples of threats or intimidation brought about on federal employees, or of even employees of the various contractors making the threats. In some cases, apparently intimidation with words has moved to stalking, being followed home from the workplace, or even physical threat and violence, with the predictable outcome. (One employee of a contractor was actually beaten by thugs, and another government employee had her well contaminated with radioactive waste by the wrongdoers.) And due to the many inappropriate relationships between some of those in industry with some of those in government, (often some level of management), the employees have not been protected, but rather the corrupt practices have been protected and allowed to grow ever more ugly.

Later in the same chapter, Hettena explains the rise of Mitch Wade’s involvement with his business MZM. Here is an excerpt:

“Wade left the Pentagon in 1992 and started MZM Inc. out of his apartment in Arlington, Virginia. As a contractor, he possessed badges or identifications that allowed him to get in and out of the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. In 1996, Wade had allowed his top-secret security clearance to lapse, although Army intelligence kept a top secret clearance for him at the National Ground Intelligence Center in Charlottesville, Virginia, according to MZM’s former security officer.”

The problem of having contractors have better access to things that are governmental than the very federal employees assigned oversight duties is not unusual. And this problem has become increasingly worse over the past eight years or so. Interference in government business by contractors has also increased. Mr. Hettena describes one machinization in 1999.

“One of Wade’s principal contacts in the Defense Department was Robert Fromm, a small, paunchy man with fading hair who worked at the Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center in Charlottesville, Virginia. In 1999, according to Wilkes, Wade wrote a letter to get rid of Paul Behrens, a government-contracting official who was becoming a thorn in his company’s side. Behrens was replaced by Fromm.”

Pressure on government officials, and offices to isolate, force out or fire oversight employees not willing to “play the game” and who insist on ethically doing their oversight job, is not uncommon according to sources I’ve heard from in recent years. And when diligent employees are forced out, “yes” men or women are placed in their empty positions - employees who will not look for nor comment on problems or irregularities. Hettena writes of this also.

“To key government contracting officials, Fromm seemed to be too close to ADCS and Wade. ‘Once Bob got involved, all I knew is that everything was acceptable. There were no problems. He would sign off on every invoice. Everything was happily ever after,” Gail Cotton said.”

Hettena continues with a story that gets much worse, as the contractors turn on each other in a frenzy of competitive greed with MZM and ADCS trying to eliminate each other from the playing field.

How money and billing and adhering to the provisions and timelines of contracts also is often irregular in cases where there is little legitimate oversight, as this excerpt shows:

“ADCS continued to wring as much money as it could out of the government. In a June 2, 1999, e-mail titled ‘Remaining funds,’ Wade wrote to Wilkes and others that $264,356.24 was left to be spent on the Panama contract and instructed company officials to prepare a bill of materials for that amount. ‘More blood from the turnip!!!’ Wade wrote.”

“By December 14, ADCS had still not finished all its work under the contract. The Panama contract also covered smaller projects, including a digital library at Camp Pendleton, a sprawling Marine base north of San Diego, and with one-day left of the contract, the company still had more work to do. Things were getting dicey: if government contracting officials learned that the company had not finished its work at the Marine base, it could be trouble. ‘We don’t want the government “talking” with them [Marines] for fear it would delay and complicate things,” ADCS vice President, Mike Williams wrote in an e-mail.”

“Wade had a solution. He instructed Williams to draft a letter for a Marine official to sign stating that ADCS had completed its work. ‘Signed …muckity-muck,” Williams wrote. ‘That’s all that needs to be said.” The muckity-muck, a Marine colonel, signed the letter a few days later, praising the company’s outstanding services. The letter went to Bob Fromm, and ADCS quietly finished its work after the contract deadline had passed.”

From there, oversight was continually undermined until a way was found to remove federal employee’s oversight of the programs altogether. The trend in the 1990’s to “Let Contractors police themselves” continued to head the business of contracting out government work further “south.”

Hettena writes that ADCS no longer was under the direction of Pentagon officials such as Gary Jones and others. The program had adopted a new name, Global Infrastructure Data Capture, and Congressman Cunningham had earmarked millions of dollars to have Wilkes and his employees do their work scanning information at the National Ground Intelligence Center. He further explains, “the switch had been engineered with Wade’s friends at the national Ground Intelligence Center and Congressman Cunningham’s help.”

Through these under the table negotiations, “an entirely new program was created in 2000, giving ADCS a fresh start away from the scrutiny from the Defense Department Inspector General’s Office.”

These manipulations created new opportunities for Wilkes and his cronies. “Changing the nature of the program held several advantages for Wilkes. Too many people were involved in the previous program, too many members of Congress with an interest in squeezing money out of it. It also meant avoiding oversight from pesky government officials like Gary Jones and Paul Behrens.”

Although all of this is graphically disturbing, unfortunately, similar scenarios exist, I am told from other government oversight employees, involving other types of government contracts with various other defense contractors.

Hettena reports that Congressman Cunningham tried to get Cheryl Roby, a higher ranking Defense Department official fired when she had “moved $3 million away from the Global Infrastructure Data Capture program, and reallocated it, believing that the money would be better spent on creating databases that would improve the Defense Department’s ability to use the scanned images.” Wilkes, upon finding he’s been “robbed” of the $3 million, set Cunningham and his staff onto Roby.

The further mixing of contractor employees with federal employees, in a mash of revolving door conflicted relationships continued to get worse. Hettena reports that after the September 11, 2001 attacks, more changes were accomplished. Prior to 9/11, the branches of the services had their own counterintelligence branches, which worked independently of each other. After 9/11, the Pentagon built “a new agency with sufficient resources and power to make sense of this confusing picture.” This equated to a rapidly growing new agency, the Counterintelligence Field Activity, which was infiltrated by employees of MZM, a defense contractor, and made for a cozy controlled environment for Mitch Wade and his MZM cronies. Furthermore with the influence and power of the likes of Congressman Cunningham, the agency grew rapidly into a large and powerful agency quickly reaching a state of complexity, which made it even more impossible to oversee and manage. And based on the growing number of “whistleblowers,” it appears conditions in government contracting have not improved.

I have chosen select quotations to illustrate the problems so inherent in government contracting today. Sadly, it is far worse than described here. Mr. Hettena has done a masterful job with his book. It is only the tip of the iceberg, as many federal and defense employees can attest to.

Hettena’s book is a must read for those who care about integrity in government and contracting, whistleblower or not. It is packed with information beyond what I have shared here and is a smooth read. I highly recommend it. -GFS

Feasting on the Spoils: The Life and Times of Randy “Duke” Cunningham, History’s Most Corrupt Congressman, St. Martin’s Press. ISBN-13: 978-0-312-36829-6

I recently finished reading Scott Hettena’s book: Feasting on the Spoils: The Life and Times of Randy “Duke” Cunningham, History’s Most Corrupt Congressman. (St. Martin’s Press, ISBN-13: 978-0-312-36829-6

Previously, in several posts on this blog, I shared observations and/or concerns about Ms. Carol Haave in her various roles within DOD and DSS. I found interesting information in Mr. Hettena’s book related to Ms. Haave’s involvement in the story of DOD/DSS’s interactions with MZM and it’s founder Mitch Wade, and his associates. It is not only the appearance of self-serving behavior, on the part of government and industry officials, but of inappropriate influence of industry on government officials who allegedly have responsibility to assure integrity and ethics in business and contracting, as well as the continuing problem of the use of the “Revolving Door” between industry and government which allows very inappropriate actions to occur that are not in the best interests of either the government or the tax-payers. -VM

Here is an excerpt from Chapter 10, “The Dream Home.”

Almost as important as the funding Cunningham and Goode generated for MZM was the influence they could wield over Defense Department officials. In this respect, Cunningham and Goode were little more than puppets for Wade, who would turn to them, just as Wilkes had, when he needed to squeeze money out of the sluggish Pentagon bureaucracy.
One of Wade’s employees, Scott Rubin, spent nine months in the office of a senior defense official in the Pentagon’s E-ring and got to see firsthand how this worked. Rubin had been detailed to the office of Deputy Undersecretary Carol Haave to help her out with her administrative work. Haave oversaw counterintelligence programs for the Defense Department, including the Counterintelligence Field Activity and the Defense Security Service, which was responsible for granting top-secret clearances. Her boss, Stephen Cambone, the undersecretary for defense intelligence, was widely viewed in the Pentagon as Donald Rumsfeld’s henchman and was loathed and feared by the services.
Wade was happy to have his own people inside Haave’s office. He dealt directly with Haave, although he wasn’t the only military contractor who did so. Wade attended a number of meetings in Haave’s office, and Rubin would sometimes escort him into the Pentagon so he could meet with her. Wade and Haave would discuss congressional mandates for the programs Wade was interested in at the Counterintelligence Field Activity and the Defense Security Service. Wade’s company was not only benefiting from these mandates, but he was arranging them through Cunningham.
A former special investigator for billionaire Howard Hughes’s company, Haave had, before joining the Pentagon, run a defense contracting firm, Sullivan Haave Associates, with her husband, Terry Sullivan, who was well-known by senior officials at the Pentagon. The Center for Public Integrity, an investigative Web site, had discovered that Sullivan Haave had a contract to spend four months in 2003 in Iraq providing advice to various ministries being set up there by coalition and local authorities. Terry Sullivan said the contract had nothing to do with his wife’s position at the Pentagon.
The Center for Public Integrity’s findings on Sullivan Haave were part of a package of stories titled “Windfalls of War,” which also included a report on MZM Inc. Wade bragged to the center that he expected to increase sales from $25 million to $120 million and hire 230 more employees in the next five years. To Wade, it seemed funny that he was getting rich off war. Following the publication of “Windfalls of War” in October 2003, Wade had a meeting in Haave’s office. “Hey, Carol,” he said, “how are you doing? Looks like we made the paper the same week.”
Haave’s deputy was a woman named Heather Anderson, the acting director of the Defense Security Service. Wade got impatient at the speed at which money for Project Goode was moving through the bureaucracy. Good had added a brief description of the Foreign Supplier Assessment Center into the Defense budget, but Anderson pushed back and asked Congress to provide more clarity about exactly what the project was all about. The delay only seemed to infuriate Wade. He called up Haave’s office and spoke with Rubin and told him to light a fire under Anderson. “You tell that dumb bitch to go fix it or she’s done for,” Wade said.
Rubin told his boss that he needed to be patient, but Wade didn’t heed the advice. A few days later, a staffer from Goode’s office called to speak with Anderson about the money for the Foreign Supplier Assessment Center. Rubin said Anderson was furious. “Your company’s over it’s head,” she screamed at him. Anderson says she was never pressured by Wade or congressional staff on his behalf. She denies making the remark to Rubin.
Wade was often frustrated with the Pentagon bureaucracy. A few months later, Rubin took a call from Wade, who asked if a multimillion-dollar appropriation for a classified program at the Counterintelligence Field Activity had moved through the Defense Department bureaucracy. When Rubin told him he didn’t think so, Wade got angry and said, “it better goddam happen or I’m going to have the congressman call and it’s going to get very bad over there for some people.”
Rubin told Wade he didn’t need to do that. “Let me just check on some things before we start breaking out the cannon,” he told his boss.
“No, “ Wade said, “I’ve run out of patience. I need an answer yesterday. This has to happen.”
Less than two hours later, Rubin took a call on the main line in Haave’s office.
“This is Congressman Duke Cunningham. I’d like to speak with Ms. Carol Haave, please.”
Rubin placed the congressman on hold and ran around his desk to speak with Haave, who took the call right away. The conversation lasted a few minutes, and then Haave came out of her office, stopped at Rubin’s desk, and told him to bring her two of her subordinates responsible for counterintelligence. Rubin brought the two men to Haave’s office, and the three held an emergency meeting to figure out what to do. The meeting lasted a half-hour and the two men walked out with actions items.
At the time, Rubin didn’t think that Cunningham was doing anything wrong except perhaps paying too much attention to a bozo like Wade. Only later would Rubin learn that he had been taken in by the congressman. “You listen to the Duke talk of loving the country and caring about the war, caring about the troops, caring about weapons,” he said. “He was in the military once before, he ad been on the front lines once before, and he probably thought to himself when he was a lieutenant commander/commander, ‘I wish I had the power to rankle that jackass in charge.’ It seemed that’s how he was coming across. Not so much that Mitch was making him call. It seemed to me that Mitch was just kind of filling him in, stoking him. That’s the way I saw it.”

I just finished reading a very good book and recommend anyone interested in Whistleblowers and in Government corruption read it as quickly as possible:

Feasting on the Spoils (The Life and Times of Randy "Duke" Cunningham, History's Most Corrupt Congressman) by Seth Hettena, St. Martin's Press, ISBN-13: 978-0-312-36829-6

I will be referring to and discussing some of what I've learned in future posts. Let me know what you think.

I hope everyone had a restful holiday and is renewed to continue the good fight.

VM

These articles came in the mail today. It would appear that the Senate has indeed passed the Whistleblower Protections in S.274. Hopefully there is enough legislative support to override the inevitable Presidential Veto!

Senate Passes Major Whistleblower Reforms
Washington, DC., December 18, 2007. Last evening the U.S. Senate, by unanimous consent, passed the Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act (S.274). This law enhances the protection for federal employee whistleblowers by expanding the scope of protected activity to cover complaints within an employees chain of command.
Passage of S.274 now sets the stage for a conference between the House and Senate to agree final legislative language. On March 14, 2007 the House enacted the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (H.R. 985), which expanded the scope of whistleblower protections to national security related agencies, permitted employees to obtain jury trials in federal court, provided enhanced protections for federal contractors and protected employees who exposed misconduct to their managers.
"The House and Senate whistleblower protections laws complement each other. They need to be melded together in conference and immediately enacted into law. Only by combining the best of both bills will federal employees obtain realistic protection. Until then, the taxpayers and citizens will remain the losers in this debate, as billions of dollars in waste remains unreported and government officials who violate the law and mislead the American people escape accountability," said Stephen M. Kohn, the President of the National Whistleblower Center.
"The Senate Action now sets the stage for the final passage of what will be one of the most important laws enacted by this Congress," added Kohn.
The House and Senate bills were strongly endorsed by a broad coalition of public groups, including the National Whistleblower Center, the Project on Government Oversight, the Government Accountability Project and Taxpayers Against Fraud, the No Fear Coalition, the Make it Safe Coalition, the National Employment Lawyers Association, OpentheGovernment.org, the Liberty Coalition, and the Bill of Rights Foundation, among numerous others.
For more information, visit the Whistleblower Protection Blog (www.WhistleblowersBlog.org)

-end-
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Since 1988 the NWC has championed whistleblower protection. In addition to advocating fair taxes for whistleblowers, the NWC is currently assisting Bunnatine Greenhouse (the former Army Corps of Engineers top contracting officer who opposed the no-bid multi billion dollar contracts awarded to Halliburton for the reconstruction of Iraq) and Mr. Bassem youssef, the FBI agent who demanded that the FBI's counterterrorism program comply with the laws concerning National Security Letters.
For more information, please visit www.whistleblowers.org and www.whistleblowersblog.org.

S.274 Passes Senate by Unanimous Consent!

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE PROTECTION OF DISCLOSURES ACT

Senate - December 17, 2007

[Page: S15782] GPO's PDF

Ms. MIKULSKI: I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 513, S. 274.

The PRESIDING OFFICER: The clerk will report the bill by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 274) to amend chapter 23 of title 5, United States Code, to clarify the disclosures of information protected from prohibited personnel practices, require a statement in nondisclosure policies, forms, and agreements that such policies, forms, and agreements conform with certain disclosure protections, provide certain authority for the Special Counsel, and for other purposes.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill which had been reported from the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs with an amendment to strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SECTION 1. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURES OF INFORMATION BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act''.

(b) Clarification of Disclosures Covered.--Section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--

(1) in subparagraph (A)--

(A) by striking ``which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences'' and inserting ``, without restriction to time, place, form, motive, context, or prior disclosure made to any person by an employee or applicant, including a disclosure made in the ordinary course of an employee's duties, that the employee or applicant reasonably believes is evidence of'';

(B) in clause (i), by striking ``a violation'' and inserting ``any violation''; and

(C) by striking ``or'' at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (B)--

(A) by striking ``which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences'' and inserting ``, without restriction to time, place, form, motive, context, or prior disclosure made to any person by an employee or applicant, including a disclosure made in the ordinary course of an employee's duties, of information that the employee or applicant reasonably believes is evidence of'';

(B) in clause (i), by striking ``a violation'' and inserting ``any violation (other than a violation of this section)''; and

(C) in clause (ii), by adding ``or'' at the end; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

``(C) any disclosure that--

``(i) is made by an employee or applicant of information required by law or Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs that the employee or applicant reasonably believes is direct and specific evidence of--

``(I) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation;

``(II) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; or

``(III) a false statement to Congress on an issue of material fact; and

``(ii) is made to--

``(I) a member of a committee of Congress having a primary responsibility for oversight of a department, agency, or element of the Federal Government to which the disclosed information relates and who is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed;

``(II) any other Member of Congress who is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed; or

``(III) an employee of Congress who has the appropriate security clearance and is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed.''.

(c) Covered Disclosures.--Section 2302(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--

(1) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``and'' at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (C)(iii), by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

``(D) `disclosure' means a formal or informal communication or transmission, but does not include a communication concerning policy decisions that lawfully exercise discretionary authority unless the employee providing the disclosure reasonably believes that the disclosure evidences--

``(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or

``(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.''.

(d) Rebuttable Presumption.--Section 2302(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by amending the matter following paragraph (12) to read as follows:

``This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the withholding of information from Congress or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who discloses information to Congress. For purposes of paragraph (8), any presumption relating to the performance of a duty by an employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action may be rebutted by substantial evidence. For purposes of paragraph (8), a determination as to whether an employee or applicant reasonably believes that they have disclosed information that evidences any violation of law, rule, regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety shall be made by determining whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude that the actions of the Government evidence such violations, mismanagement, waste, abuse, or danger.''.

(e) Nondisclosure Policies, Forms, and Agreements; Security Clearances; and Retaliatory Investigations.--

(1) PERSONNEL ACTION.--Section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--

(A) in clause (x), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon; and

(B) by redesignating clause (xi) as clause (xiv) and inserting after clause (x) the following:

``(xi) the implementation or enforcement of any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement;

``(xii) a suspension, revocation, or other determination relating to a security clearance or any other access determination by a covered agency;

``(xiii) an investigation, other than any ministerial or nondiscretionary fact finding activities necessary for the agency to perform its mission, of an employee or applicant for employment because of any activity protected under this section; and''

(2) PROHIBITED PERSONNEL PRACTICE.--Section 2302(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--

(A) in paragraph (11), by striking ``or'' at the end;

(B) in paragraph (12), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and

(C) by inserting after paragraph (12) the following:

``(13) implement or enforce any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement, if such policy, form, or agreement does not contain the following statement: `These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by Executive Order No. 12958; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse, or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents); and the statutes which protect against disclosures that could compromise national security, including sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by such Executive order and such statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling'; or

``(14) conduct, or cause to be conducted, an investigation, other than any ministerial or nondiscretionary fact finding activities necessary for the agency to perform its mission, of an employee or applicant for employment because of any activity protected under this section.''.

(3) BOARD AND COURT REVIEW OF ACTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY CLEARANCES.--

(A) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 77 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 7702 the following:``§7702a. Actions relating to security clearances

``(a) In any appeal relating to the suspension, revocation, or other determination relating to a security clearance or access determination, the Merit Systems Protection Board or any reviewing court--

``(1) shall determine whether paragraph (8) or (9) of section 2302(b) was violated;

``(2) may not order the President or the designee of the President to restore a security clearance or otherwise reverse a determination of clearance status or reverse an access determination; and

``(3) subject to paragraph (2), may issue declaratory relief and any other appropriate relief.

``(b)(1) If, in any final judgment, the Board or court declares that any suspension, revocation, or other determination with regard to a security clearance or access determination was made in violation of paragraph (8) or (9) of section 2302(b), the affected agency shall conduct a review of that suspension, revocation, access determination, or other determination, giving great weight to the Board or court judgment.

``(2) Not later than 30 days after any Board or court judgment declaring that a security clearance suspension, revocation, access determination, or other determination was made in violation of paragraph (8) or (9) of section 2302(b), the affected agency shall issue an unclassified report to the congressional committees of jurisdiction (with a classified annex if necessary), detailing the circumstances of the agency's security clearance suspension, revocation, other determination, or access determination. A report under this paragraph shall include any proposed agency action with regard to the security clearance or access determination.

``(c) An allegation that a security clearance or access determination was revoked or suspended in retaliation for a protected disclosure shall receive expedited review by the Office of Special Counsel, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and any reviewing court.

``(d) For purposes of this section, corrective action may not be ordered if the agency demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of such disclosure.''.

(B) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--The table of sections for chapter 77 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 7702 the following:

``7702a. Actions relating to security clearances.''.

(f) Exclusion of Agencies by the President.--Section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:

``(ii)(I) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Security Agency; and

``(II) as determined by the President, any executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, if the determination (as that determination relates to a personnel action) is made before that personnel action; or''.

(g) Attorney Fees.--Section 1204(m)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``agency involved'' and inserting ``agency where the prevailing party is employed or has applied for employment''.

(h) Disciplinary Action.--Section 1215(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

``(3)(A) A final order of the Board may impose--

``(i) disciplinary action consisting of removal, reduction in grade, debarment from Federal employment for a period not to exceed 5 years, suspension, or reprimand;

``(ii) an assessment of a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000; or

``(iii) any combination of disciplinary actions described under clause (i) and an assessment described under clause (ii).

``(B) In any case in which the Board finds that an employee has committed a prohibited personnel practice under paragraph (8) or (9) of section 2302(b), the Board shall impose disciplinary action if the Board finds that the activity protected under paragraph (8) or (9) of section 2302(b) was a significant motivating factor, even if other factors also motivated the decision, for the employee's decision to take, fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take a personnel action, unless that employee demonstrates, by preponderance of evidence, that the employee would have taken, failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take the same personnel action, in the absence of such protected activity.''.

(i) Special Counsel Amicus Curiae Appearance.--Section 1212 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

``(h)(1) The Special Counsel is authorized to appear as amicus curiae in any action brought in a court of the United States related to any civil action brought in connection with section 2302(b) (8) or (9), or subchapter III of chapter 73, or as otherwise authorized by law. In any such action, the Special Counsel is authorized to present the views of the Special Counsel with respect to compliance with section 2302(b) (8) or (9) or subchapter III of chapter 73 and the impact court decisions would have on the enforcement of such provisions of law.

``(2) A court of the United States shall grant the application of the Special Counsel to appear in any such action for the purposes described in subsection (a).''.

(j) Judicial Review.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--Section 7703(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

``(b)(1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and paragraph (2), a petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review must be filed within 60 days after the date the petitioner received notice of the final order or decision of the Board.

``(B) During the 5-year period beginning on the effective date of the Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act, a petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board in a case alleging a violation of paragraph (8) or (9) of section 2302(b) shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction as provided under subsection (b)(2).''.

(2) REVIEW OBTAINED BY OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.--Section 7703(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

``(d)(1) Except as provided under paragraph (2), this paragraph shall apply to any review obtained by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. The Director of the Office of Personnel Management may obtain review of any final order or decision of the Board by filing, within 60 days after the date the Director received notice of the final order or decision of the Board, a petition for judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit if the Director determines, in his discretion, that the Board erred in interpreting a civil service law, rule, or regulation affecting personnel management and that the Board's decision will have a substantial impact on a civil service law, rule, regulation, or policy directive. If the Director did not intervene in a matter before the Board, the Director may not petition for review of a Board decision under this section unless the Director first petitions the Board for a reconsideration of its decision, and such petition is denied. In addition to the named respondent, the Board and all other parties to the proceedings before the Board shall have the right to appear in the proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The granting of the petition for judicial review shall be at the discretion of the Court of Appeals.

``(2) During the 5-year period beginning on the effective date of the Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act, this paragraph shall apply to any review relating to paragraph (8) or (9) of section 2302(b) obtained by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. The Director of the Office of Personnel Management may obtain review of any final order or decision of the Board by filing, within 60 days after the date the Director received notice of the final order or decision of the Board, a petition for judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction as provided under subsection (b)(2) if the Director determines, in his discretion, that the Board erred in interpreting paragraph (8) or (9) of section 2302(b). If the Director did not intervene in a matter before the Board, the Director may not petition for review of a Board decision under this section unless the Director first petitions the Board for a reconsideration of its decision, and such petition is denied. In addition to the named respondent, the Board and all other parties to the proceedings before the Board shall have the right to appear in the proceeding before the court of appeals. The granting of the petition for judicial review shall be at the discretion of the Court of Appeals.''.

(k) Nondisclosure Policies, Forms, and Agreements.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--

(A) REQUIREMENT.--Each agreement in Standard Forms 312 and 4414 of the Government and any other nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement of the Government shall contain the following statement: ``These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by Executive Order No. 12958; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents); and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by such Executive order and such statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.''.

(B) ENFORCEABILITY.--Any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement described under subparagraph (A) that does not contain the statement required under subparagraph (A) may not be implemented or enforced to the extent such policy, form, or agreement is inconsistent with that statement.

(2) PERSONS OTHER THAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement that is to be executed by a person connected with the conduct of an intelligence or intelligence-related activity, other than an employee or officer of the United States Government, may contain provisions appropriate to the particular activity for which such document is to be used. Such form or agreement shall, at a minimum, require that the person will not disclose any classified information received in the course of such activity unless specifically authorized to do so by the United States Government. Such nondisclosure forms shall also make it clear that such forms do not bar disclosures to Congress or to an authorized official of an executive agency or the Department of Justice that are essential to reporting a substantial violation of law.

(l) Clarification of Whistleblower Rights for Critical Infrastructure Information.--Section 214(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 133(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``For purposes of this section a permissible use of independently obtained information includes the disclosure of such information under section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code.''.

(m) Advising Employees of Rights.--Section 2302(c) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``, including how to make a lawful disclosure of information that is specifically required by law or Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs to the Special Counsel, the Inspector General of an agency, Congress, or other agency employee designated to receive such disclosures'' after ``chapter 12 of this title''.

(n) Scope of Due Process.--

(1) SPECIAL COUNSEL.--Section 1214(b)(4)(B)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``, after a finding that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor,'' after ``ordered if''.

(2) INDIVIDUAL ACTION.--Section 1221(e)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``, after a finding that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor,'' after ``ordered if''.

This article came in the mail this morning. I pass it along for general interest. Thank you Darlene!

HOW?

By Darlene Fitzgerald
National Security Whistleblower

December 19, 2007

Over this past year, there have been numerous articles, Senate testimony and reports detailing the Bush administration’s squandering of billions of our tax dollars with virtually nothing to show for it. As recent as this month, the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) released yet another shocking report appropriately entitled, “Homeland Security for Sale - DHS: Five Years of Mismanagement,” which was aired on MSNBC and published in several major newspapers.

In June 2007, the Washington Post released an article entitled, “DHS, 124 Million Dollars - No Bid Contracts.” Another article entitled, “Getting Hosed by DHS” and another quotes Senator Leahy on January 4, 2007 as stating, “More than 50 billion to Iraq private contractors hired to guard busses, drive trucks, food and shelter troops and rebuild the country, ”and of course there’s not much to show for it. I could go on and on report after report, but I think you get the picture.

Each and every time one of these reports exposes the latest-greatest scandal, the immediate response from the American public is of course, “HOW can this happen!” As an insider of our government for many years, as a National Security Whistleblower, author and most importantly, a caring citizen who has avidly fought against this “HOW” for almost 30 years now, I’ve learned a few things about “HOW.”

Most of the above-mentioned scandals that have managed to actually make it into the main stream media, no easy task I might add, make it appear as though this “HOW” is the result of some illusive, complicated, overwhelming machinery that is our government. This is simply not so. In my humble opinion, “HOW” can be broken down into some basic, simple principals that we as Americans can understand.

First, we have to realize that our government is made up of human beings, with all the frailties, good and evil, of our species. I like to divide government employees (including the folks at the very top - Congress, Bush administration, etc.) into four (4) basic categories:

1. Greedy, self-absorbed people whose only real interest in their jobs is to see just how powerful and rich they can become, by hook or by crook (mostly the latter). These employees, unfortunately, tend to rise to the top of every agency over the backs, or through them with a knife, of the folks in category number four (4) below. These are people who have no conscience and truly believe that they are above the law. This, as you may imagine, is the most dangerous
category.

2. Lazy people. These are the folks that will just “go along to get along.” They are content in doing just enough to get by to get a pay check, and not enough to make any real difference. They will turn their heads the other way, and maybe even go along with things they know are wrong. They feel that they can simply ride the coattails of the folks in category number one (1).

3. Cowards. These are basically good hard-working government employees that ignore obvious waist, fraud and abuse in our government because they will feel guilty about doing nothing - which is exactly what they will do - nothing. These are people who justify in their minds that what they think they are witnessing just can’t be happening (denial), or justify in their minds why they have to stay silent. FEAR drives this category of folks, and for good reason, to be further explained below.

4. Stand Ups. These are good, honest folks who work hard, and refuse to cave into the fear. What fear you ask? The fear that this article is about, because you see, the FEAR is the answer to the “HOW.” I’m speaking of the fear that will be most certainly generated when their government chain of command retaliates against them, unencumbered by any real laws or regulations, when these folks dare to speak truth to power. These folks will find themselves very quickly at a crossroads where they have a decision to make - fall into one of the above categories, quit their jobs and loose their careers, or become a Whistleblower, and stand up to the bullies that their managers and most coworkers will very quickly become if they refuse to shut up and get in line. These people find themselves between a rock and a hard place - and this is where we get the “HOW” in our government.

On May 15, 2007, the Government Accountability Project (GAP), the No Fear Coalition, the Project on Government Oversite (POGO), and several other Whistleblower organizations sponsored the Washington Whistleblower Week in Washington, D.C. in support of the much needed “Whistleblower Protection Act,” Senate Bill #494 and the “No Fear Act,” Senate Bill #201. Whistleblowers from all around the country came to testify before a Congressional panel in order to get these bills passed. These bills have already passed the House, overwhelmingly, and were sitting idle in the Senate.

It is important to note that it was officially read into the record that more than 700 government employees wanted to appear and testify at this hearing. This alone, demonstrates clearly just how pervasive and systemic Whistleblower retaliation has become in our government. I was fortunate enough to be one of the 25 or so who were allowed to give live testimony. As I sat there all day listening to the testimony of some of the bravest folks I’ve ever had the privilege of meeting tell their horrendous stories exposing government waist, fraud, corruption and abuse on an enormous scale, I noticed a few things:

A. Most of these stories were extremely well documented and witnessed. I’m sure that is exactly why they were chosen over others to give this testimony.

B. Secondly, most of these stories weren’t covered by the main stream media, and they most certainly should have been. Some of these stories I’ve summarized below. When you read what they were in fact whistleblowing about, I’m sure that you will agree that they were more than worthy of main stream media attention.

C. The folks that were selected to testify were the “Cream of the crop” employees with the highest of ratings on their progress reports - before they blew the whistle. Most of them brought along their employee folders which included numerous awards and commendations, promotions, rave reviews and other accolades just to further demonstrate this point. Further, most of them had many years as a government employee, all in good standing.

D. Finally, everyone of these highly decorated, highly promoted, “Cream of the crop” employees immediately became labeled by their agencies as unproductive, incompetent, lazy, and/or crazy, immediately after they followed their conscience and bravely reported the waste, fraud, abuse, or corruption that they had witnessed. Moreover, most of them had either been fired, were in the process of being fired, or facing criminal charges.

I’ve written a short summary of the testimony of just a few of the Whistleblowers, including my own. I highly encourage all who read this article to go online, type in their names, and read their testimony in its entirety.

1.) Bunnatine Greenhouse

Ms. Greenhouse was a United States Army Corps of Engineers, senior procurement executive who blew the whistle on violations of issuing government contracts to Halliburton, “As the ramp-up to the Iraqi War escalated.” Greenhouse did what most loyal government employees do. She notified her concerns to her chain of command. “I immediately questioned whether the corps had the legal authority to function as the Army’s delegated contracting authority. The Corps had absolutely no competencies related to oil production. Restoration of oil production was simply outside of the scope of our Congressionally mandated mission,” she explained. “But it was too late, the Halliburton express had already left the station.”

“I raised concern with officials representing the Department of Defense, The Department of the Army and the Corps of Engineers....after the draft had been approved by representatives of the office of the Secretary of Defense, the five year, no compete clause remained in place. I could not sign the document in good faith knowing that this extended period was unreasonable... Therefore, next to my signature I handwrote the following comment directly onto the original document: I caution that extending this sole source effort beyond a one year period could convey an invalid perception that there is not strong intent for a limited competition.” Ms. Greenhouse did this to insure that her concern over this obvious blatant abuse of this process would not be overlooked. “Instead, it was just ignored,” she added.

On December 11, 2003, the Defense Contract Audit Agency issued a draft report on concluding that this contract overcharge for the purchase of fuel by $61,000,000. However, the firestorm over this issue was significantly dampened a week later when, “The Corps simply asserted that the price charge for the fuel was “fair and reasonable.”

Ms. Greenhouse would not back down and just go away. As the pressure mounted she was eventually, “summoned to a meeting” where they notified her that she was to be removed from her Senior Executive Service and from her position. “I had no other alternative at that juncture but to file a formal request or investigation with the then-Acting Secretary of the Army and to appropriate members of Congress.” She ended her testimony by thanking the National Whistleblower Center for their support for, “Without their effort I could not have survived the political firestorm that burns around me.”

2.) Dr. Marsha Coleman-Adebayo

Dr. Coleman-Adebayo was a senior policy analyst fo the Environment Protection Agency (EPA), until she was terminated, shortly after she reported that an American company was generating toxic waste that was poisoning African workers. At that time, she was serving as an African affairs specialist on the Gore-Mbeki Commission. Instead of being praised for her findings, she was removed from the commission. She has received extreme harassment, death and rape threats when she exposed the environmental and human disasters taking place in the Brits, South Africa, vanadium mines. Her concerns were eerily similar to the complaints of other Whistleblowers. On August 18th, 2000, a federal jury found the EPA guilty of violating the civil rights of Dr. Coleman-Adebayo on the basis of a hostile work environment.

3.) Bogdon Dzakovic

Mr. Dzakovic was a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) security expert who blew the whistle on lax oversight and testing of security at airports, before and after 9-11. Dzakovic began by explaining HOW abuses of secrecy are a, “clear and present danger to homeland security.” Dzakovic had served seven (7) years with the FAA Red Team, which conducted undercover test on airport security through simulated terrorist attacks. “Although we breached security with ridiculous ease up to 90% of the time, the FAA suppressed these warnings. Instead we were ordered not to write up our findings and not to retest airports.”

After the terrorist attack on 9-11 the FAA and other government officials were all seen in different reports, and in testimony to Congress saying things like Secretary Rice stated, “How could we have known this was going to happen?” “The truth is,” stated Dzakovic, “they did know. What happened on 9-11 was not a failure in the system, it was a system designed for failure. FAA very conscientiously and deliberately orchestrated a dangerous facade of security.” Dzakovic further testified, “There are serious indications that FAA deceived the public about what happened on 9-11.”

About a month after 9-11, Dzakovic filed a Whistleblower Disclosure against FAA with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC). Last year the OSC found a substantial likelihood that Dzakovic was right and ordered Secretary Mineta to investigate. “Immediately after our Red Team warnings were vindicated, however, we were grounded. Later I was removed from my position as a Red Team leader with no explanation and placed in a career limbo,” he testified to the panel.

Dzakovic did what most Whistleblowers do and he took his concerns to the Inspector General’s (IG) Office. A senior official from that office stated to him that, “The IG couldn’t take any action against the FAA unless you give me a dead body and a smoking gun, I can’t do anything against the FAA.” Dzakovic further testified “Well, we now have nearly 3,000 dead bodies, and a smoking cannon, and the IG still refuses to take action against the FAA.” “...not one person has been disciplined for mismanaging an agency that operated in a manner that was a substantial and specific danger to public safety contributing directly to the nearly 3,000 deaths on 9-11. As a matter of fact, many of these same managers have been promoted within TSA and are still with the FAA, and are managing the FAA internal investigations/security mission and its hazardous materials mission in precisely the same way asit mismanaged its previous aviation security mission before 9-11.”

TSA has been reported repeatedly for misuses of hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayer’s money while civil aviation security is, “little better now than it was before 9-11" according to Dzakovic. Meanwhile Dzakovic testified that he has been relegate to doing jobs like, “punching holes in paper and putting orientation binders together for the hundreds of newly hired TSA employees. My current job is even further removed from keeping bombs, weapons and terrorist off planes.”

4.) Darlene Fitzgerald

Summary of my testimony before the Congressional panel:

I had more than 20 years of combined law enforcement experience in the military, private industry and as a Special Agent, when I resigned from my agency because I refused to work for an agency that was worse than the people I put in jail. In 1998 I was in charge of a U.S. Customs task force operating an extensive investigation called Operation Rite Rail. We uncovered tons of narcotics and contraband being facilitated into the U.S. from Mexico via railroad tanker cars - with the apparent approval of U.S. Customs managers. This resulted in a landmark civil case in federal court: Fitzgerald - Nunn Vs. Department of Homeland Security. At this trial Superior Court Judge Yvette Palazuelos took the stand as our witness and made history by being the first sitting judge ever to testify against the U.S. government.

High level-Customs’ managers shut down my investigation into narcotics smuggling. I had already seized 8000 pounds of marijuana and 34 kilos of uncut cocaine in just one pressurized railroad tanker car. I had in my grasp five more of these cars imported from Mexico that were improperly manifested as “empty,” yet contained 25 to 40 tons of suspected contraband. I was ordered off the case and told to shut down my operation.

At the trial, Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAIC) Gary Pinkava took the stand for Customs, and admitted without elaboration that he would not allow me or my supervisor to pressure test, at no charge to the government, these highly suspected tanker cars. This would have been the largest seizure on record for any agency. Subsequently, these tanker cars were surreptitiously released into the commerce of the U.S. uninspected by anyone.

Sufficient evidence to warrant a grand jury investigation of the following was most certainly exposed at the above styled trial: Witness tampering, Facilitation of the importation of 25 to 40 tons of contraband into the U.S., Perjury, Misprision of Felony, and possible Subornation of Perjury. This evidence was sufficient to warrant the initiation of a grand jury investigation - yet there was none. (Complete transcripts of this trial testimony may be read at http://www.BorderGate.net.) Further, since the submission of our witness list in this case, every single person on that list has been either severely harassed, arrested, investigated, threatened, and / or fired.

What my task force and I also exposed is the horrendous national security terrorist threat that these rail tanker cars pose to our nation. Timothy McVey blew up the Federal Murrah Building in Oklahoma City with about one ton of ammonium nitrate in an unsealed-cargo truck. This cowardly attack killed scores of people and resulted in more than eleven damaged buildings being torn down. Yet a terrorist can put forty times this amount of ammonium nitrate in a railroad tanker car and pressurize it. This would create what is essentially the world’s largest “pipe bomb.”

It is important to note that there have been no other rail tanker car seizures since that done by my task force in 1998. Have the drug smugglers and terrorist simply quit trying to enter the U.S., or have they been operating freely with the assistance of corrupt and / or incompetent managers within DHS.

The real victims here are all of the brave Whistleblowers who have come forward with important information that exposes threats to our national security. What has happened, and continues to happen to all the Whistleblowers in my “BorderGate” story is not only wrong, but it places our country at grave risk as well. To quote a famous French free thinker Voltaire, “Being right is dangerous when government is wrong.”

That concluded my testimony.

It is important to note that the only major news organization that covered this important Congressional testimony was CSPAN. No other major news agency bothered covering this most important, scandalous testimony. This too is a large part of the problem which results in the “HOW.” In years past, the media was the ultimate check and balance for our government. Now, I’m sad to say, they are not. Had the media rolled up their sleeves and not “jumped in the boat” with the Bush administration - Had they done their jobs and asked the hard questions in the first place, maybe we would have never rushed into the Iraq war.

When the media does squeeze a Whistleblower’s story into their busy day of Britney Spears, Paris Hilton and Ellen’s dog, they only tell about the scandal itself. I have yet to see any main stream media conduct a followup on what happens to the Whistleblower who risked everything to bring them the information. The public never knows of how the Whistleblower is almost always fired from their job, and then cleverly “blackballed” from future employment by their previous government managers. You never hear about how the Whistleblower is usually the major bred-winner of the family, and when they can no longer work their spouses don’t understand and divorce them.

The Whistleblower becomes isolated, loses his/her home, files bankruptcy and is dragged through a divorce. Then, because of the mountain of stress piled upon them in a relatively short period of time, the Whistleblower begins to have serious health problems. I personally know of too many Whistleblowers who have died from stress related heart conditions, or have just outright given up and committed suicide. Their lives are destroyed, and all because they had the guts to do the right thing. I personally have had family members state, “You had that great job making all that money and didn’t have the brains to just shut up and keep your job - how stupid.” This is rarely, if ever, covered by the media. To the press, the Whistleblower is simply cannon fodder - a person to use to get their story.

Maybe, if the media would air more time and space to Whistleblowers instead of hours and hours of Britney Spears and Paris Hilton, maybe if they did their jobs, maybe we wouldn’t be asking so much about “HOW.” I’m convinced that if Richard Nixon had completed his “Watergate” crimes in 2007, he would have gotten away with it. The days of “investigative journalism” by real reporters are seemingly over. It’s all too easy and much cheaper for media executives to air “talking head” news on Britney Spears and Paris Hilton than to do investigative reporting.

As I sat in Congress that day in May 2007 and listened to the numerous accounts of government waste, fraud, corruption, abuse, and most important, the horrendous retaliation faced by the Whistleblowers who dared to speak truth to power, I realized that I had the answer to HOW. This is HOW our government officials get away with it all - because they can. As you read this article, what is probably the most important piece of legislation in our history sits dormant in the Senate. The Whistleblower Protection Act would provide a real punch to the “HOW.” Yet, our Senate does nothing, and our media has yet to report that this bill is being ignored - much like how the media has ignored the Whistleblowers themselves who dare to take on the “HOW.”

Further, as you read this letter our national debt grows at just under $ONE MILLION DOLLARS A MINUTE (as reported on December 6th, 2007 by MSNBC & other news organizations), largely due to stories like the ones testified to by Whistleblowers this year before Congress. Now that you the reader fully understands “HOW,” I encourage all who read this to do your part to assist Whistleblowers to combat the “HOW” by calling or writing to Senator Harry Reid. Senator Reid has the power to move this bill to the floor for a vote. Every phone call or letter to his office will help (202) 224-3542 / fax (202) 224-7327. I also encourage you to learn more about “HOW” by visiting the following web sites:

The Government Accountability Project: http://www.whistleblower.org

The Project on Government Oversite: http://www.pogo.org

The BorderGate web site: http://www.BorderGate.net

-- Darlene Fitzgerald is a National Security Whistleblower, author of “BorderGate, the story the government doesn’t want you to read”.

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