After all the trauma that has been going on over the betrayal of Justice Whistleblowers the past couple of days, I think it is important to point out how much I respect those who put themselves on point to report wrongdoing when and where they found it. I have the utmost respect and admiration for people who can see the big picture and who are willing to stand up and confront what should not be. I thank all of you and encourage you not to give up. I do not believe your causes are lost, even though the very people who were supposed to champion your causes have let you down in a big way. I think some forces are gathering thanks to all of you and many others who are working in other ways to bring about justice. I believe we are making some progress. Please continue to stand up and stir things up.

For those who need to (and I hope you will continue to do so) report wrongdoing, I would suggest going to the truly anonymous tip line of the Project on Government Oversite (POGO) to report it there.

Go to POGO.org and then click on report corruption link on their site page, or use this page address: http://www.pogo.org/p/x/exposecorruption.html

Someone mentioned on a blog on The Next Hurrah yesterday that they thought it was good the whistleblowers could know they were not alone and see who else was blowing the whistle. While it is true, as the commenter said, that combining related tips and reports may help support the processing and holding the wrongdoers accountable for the sum total of the various reports, outing all of the reporters was NOT the way to do it. They and their families have been put at risk, more than most know. I would suggest people immediately contact POGO for assistance. There are a great many "cases" being put together right now. Yours may be a part of a much bigger picture, and you may may be helped and supported by others reports, and they may be helped and supported by yours.

I leave you with a quote courageous Boeing Whistleblower, Gerald Eastman, has posted on his site, The Last Inspector.com:

"The world is a dangerous place, not because of those who do evil, but because of those who look on and do nothing." -Albert Einstein

Take care of yourselves and join together to support each other and form a more indomitable force!

Victorian Muse

From TPM Muckraker
The Story Behind The Whistleblower Email Screw-Up
By Paul Kiel - October 29, 2007, 5:56PM

Friday night, we reported that the House Judiciary Committee had mistakenly sent the email addresses of would-be whistleblowers to everyone who had written in to the committee's Justice Department politicization tip line. A committee spokesperson responded to that story with a statement apologizing for the "technological error."
In a statement released this afternoon (which can be read in full below) a committee spokesperson clarified that the error was, in fact, human. For those of you interested in the nitty gritty, the "nonpartisan, clerical employee" of the committee who was tasked with sending the email out to the list screwed up by assuming that checking "private" in Microsoft Outlook's Distribution List function meant that recipient names would be hidden. Alas, not so.
The full statement is below.

The tip line was created to be a confidential method for Justice Department employees to provide the Judiciary Committee with information that might aid the Committee in its ongoing investigation of alleged politicization at the Justice Department. Because of the confidentiality agreement, the Committee will not discuss any emails sent on this tip line. An erroneous communication was sent that may have compromised the anonymity of recipients of the email. An earlier statement labeled this a "technological error." To be clear, this was a user error in operating the email program.

The Committee apologizes for the concern this error may have caused, and is making every effort to protect the confidentiality of those who chose to provide information on the tip line. Any whistleblowers who sent in tips to this website are entitled to full legal protection. We are determined to ensure that they receive that protection and are taking steps to further that objective.
The following is a detailed chronology of this tip line and of the error that occurred:

1. In the course of several investigations this year, the House Judiciary Committee received information that there were individuals who wanted to share information about wrongdoing at the Department of Justice but were reluctant to do so over the phone. It was determined that it would be desirable for them to have a means of electronically communicating with the Committee.

2. On or about June 20, the tip line web page was launched. Within a day or two thereafter, the Committee Minority raised concerns with the House Parliamentarian that the terms of the web page might violate the Rules of the House. Specifically, the Minority asserted that, because the web page solicited the tips, the tips were Committee records and the Minority was, then, entitled to equitable access to these records and, therefore, access to the tips could not be restricted to Majority staff and Majority Members. The Parliamentarian agreed with the Minority’s interpretation of the Rules.

3. Majority and Minority staff engaged in discussions to determine what restrictions could be placed on access to the tips, consistent with House rules, which would help secure the confidentiality of the information. It was agreed that during those discussions neither the Majority or Minority would have access to the tips.
4. The Majority and Minority recently reached an agreement as to the conditions for access to the tips. Specifically, it was agreed that the tips would be held in "Executive Session," with access limited to Committee members and specifically designated staff, and that any broader release of the tips could only occur upon a vote of the full Committee. The Committee voted to approve a resolution that reflected the agreement on October 24.

5. Because the conditions for access to the tips had been changed from what had been indicated on the web page, the resolution further specified that a Committee staff member would advise everyone who had submitted information via the tip line of the changed conditions for access and giving them three business days to withdraw any information submitted. During these three business days, the Resolution specified, it would continue to be the case that no Committee staff or Member would review the tips.

6. A nonpartisan, clerical employee of the Committee was tasked with sending the email.

7. To carry out this task, the employee created two distribution lists in Microsoft Outlook called "Right Justice" and "Right Justice2". The employee’s recollection is that a checkbox in the Outlook Distribution List function was checked which was marked "private." The employee mistakenly believed that this would hide the names on the distribution list from the recipients. However, in fact, while it appeared to the employee that the name of the distribution list would be the only text on the "to:" field of the email, all addresses were shown when the email was received. This was an inadvertent clerical error, and contrary to speculation, not the result of "hacking" or any malicious act.

8. As a result of this mistake, all email addresses of all recipients were visible to everyone who received the email. No further information or content of any of the emails was revealed.

9. There were more than 150 emails on the list. Among the emails on the list was apparently the public email address of the Vice President as well as other presumably fictitious email addresses containing profanity. Presumably, these were submitted as pranks to the tip line. The Committee has not accessed the content of the emails purporting to be sent from these addresses and has no way of knowing how or why these emails are included in the list.

10. A substantial number of email addresses also appear to include portions of the proper names of individuals. To comply with the resolution of the Committee and to avoid even further potential exposure from potential whistleblowers, the Committee will not release the list of recipients or any further details about the list.

11. The Committee is familiar with legal protections involving whistleblowers and stands ready to assist any whistleblower who feels that they are in any jeopardy as a result of this mistake or for any other reason. We have not yet been contacted by any such whistleblower in this regard.

It took awhile to verify the information I passed along in my previous post. It appears it was the list of email addresses which were outed. See the following original source article from Talking Points Memo Muckraker:

D'Oh: House Panel Screw-Up Reveals Whistleblower Email Addresses
By Paul Kiel - October 26, 2007, 10:07PM
Here's a whoops with a capital W.

This summer the House Judiciary Committee launched an effort to collect tips from would-be whistleblowers in the Justice Department. The U.S. attorney firings scandal had shown that much was amiss in the Department, and with the danger of retaliation very real, the committee had set up a form on the committee's website for people to blow the whistle privately about abuses there. Although the panel said it would not accept anonymous tips, it assured those who came forward that their identity would be held in the "strictest confidence."

But in an email sent out today, the committee inadvertently sent the email addresses of all the would-be whistleblowers to everyone who had written in to the tipline. The committee email was sent to tipsters who had used the website form, including presumably whistleblowers themselves, and all of the recipients of the email were accidentally included in the "to:" field -- instead of concealing those addresses with a so-called blind carbon copy or "bcc:".

Only the email addresses were exposed; none of the names or other identifying information of the whistleblowers was revealed. The blunder, however, was noticed by a number of people who had used the website form and received today's email. One disgruntled recipient replied to the entire list of whistleblowers angrily complaining about the snafu; two others forwarded the committee email to TPMmuckraker with similar complaints.

Compounding the mistake, the committee later sent out a second email attempting to recall the original email; it, too, included all recipients in the "to:" field, according to a recipient of the emails.

A committee spokesperson emailed the following statement in response to TPMmuckraker's questions:

The tip line was created to be a confidential method for Justice Department employees to provide the Judiciary Committee with information that might aid the Committee in its ongoing investigation of politicization at the Justice Department. Because of the confidentiality agreement, the Committee will not discuss any emails sent on this tip line. A technological error in a recent communication inadvertently disclosed certain email addresses. The Committee has not begun its review of the emails, and does not know if any of them are in fact from Justice Department employees as opposed to private citizens expressing more general views. The Committee apologizes for any concern this error may have caused, and is making every effort to protect the confidentiality of those who chose to provide information on the tip line.
It's not immediately clear whether the mistake will lead to the exposure of those who had contacted the committee. There are more than 150 recipient addresses revealed in the email. Some of the email addresses appear to be transparently fake, but there's also, much more troubling, a vice_president@whitehouse.gov carbon copied on the email, which is the public email address for Vice President Dick Cheney. In other words, an email containing the email addresses of all the whistleblowers who had written in to the committee tipline was sent to public email address of Vice President Cheney.

The purpose of today's mis-sent email was, ironically enough, to announce careful new procedures about to be put in place by the committee for reviewing the tips received through the committee's website. No one on the committee or any staff has reviewed any of the tips, pursuant to an agreement reached between committee Democrats and Republicans. Only "Members of the Judiciary Committee, and Committee staff specifically designated by the Democratic Chairman or Ranking Republican Member, will have access to the e-mails, and they are prohibited from removing any e-mail from Committee offices," today's email read. "This message is also to advise you that you have three business days...­ to notify us if you wish to withdraw your e-mail rather than have it reviewed by the Committee under these procedures."

The email can be read below the fold:

Subject: Important notice re House Judiciary Committee tip line, e-mails

You are among the people who have submitted e-mails to the U.S. House Judiciary Committee on its Web site tip line for Department of Justice employees to report allegations or concerns regarding possible wrongdoing involving the Department. This message is to inform you that the Committee is now ending the tip line and has voted to approve procedures governing the confidentiality of the e-mails received.

Under these procedures, only Members of the Judiciary Committee, and Committee staff specifically designated by the Democratic Chairman or Ranking Republican Member, will have access to the e-mails, and they are prohibited from removing any e-mail from Committee offices. Any broader disclosure of any e-mail would first require a vote of the Committee to authorize it. It would be the Committee¹s intent to consult with the sender of any e-mail before any such vote takes place.

This message is also to advise you that you have three business days ­ until 11:59 p.m. on Tuesday, October 30 ­ to notify us if you wish to withdraw your e-mail rather than have it reviewed by the Committee under these procedures. If you so notify us, your e-mail, along with any records pertaining to its submission, will be destroyed. If you do not so notify us, we will conclude that you have agreed to submit your e-mail to the Committee under these procedures.

Any request that an e-mail be withdrawn should state in the subject space "PLEASE WITHDRAW E-MAIL," and should include in the body of the request the e-mail address under which your e-mail was submitted, if different than the one used to make the request to withdraw. It should also specify the date and time, if known, or the approximate date and time, that the e-mail was submitted.

Thank you for your interest in the Judiciary Committee¹s work.

From http://thenexthurrah.typepad.com
About that Need for a Whistleblower Law...
by emptywheel

I believe it was just the other day when I was saying it was more
urgent to implement whistleblower protection than to write a new
journalist shield law. This doesn't change my opinion in that regard.
This summer the House Judiciary Committee launched an effort to
collect tips from would-be whistleblowers in the Justice Department.
The U.S. attorney firings scandal had shown that much was amiss in
the Department, and with the danger of retaliation very real, the
committee had set up a form on the committee's website for people to
blow the whistle privately about abuses there. Although the panel
said it would not accept anonymous tips, it assured those who came
forward that their identity would be held in the "strictest
confidence."
But in an email sent out today, the committee inadvertently sent the
email addresses of all the would-be whistleblowers to everyone who
had written in to the tipline. The committee email was sent to
tipsters who had used the website form, including presumably
whistleblowers themselves, and all of the recipients of the email
were accidentally included in the "to:" field -- instead of
concealing those addresses with a so-called blind carbon copy
or "bcc:".
See, if we didn't force our whistleblowers to sneak around so much,
this wouldn't be the monumental **** up it is. As it is though, this
is likely to discourage a more whistleblowers from coming forward.
That say, I will at least entertain (for the moment) that this was
deliberate. The Republicans have always hated this tip line--they've
been trying to shut it down since Conyers started this. And the email
explained that the tip line has now been shut down.
This message is to inform you that the Committee is now ending the
tip line and has voted to approve procedures governing the
confidentiality of the e-mails received.
So this email included the emails of everyone who has--or will--
submit a tip to the tip line. And that entire list was carbon copied
to Cheney's office.
Some of the email addresses appear to be transparently fake, but
there's also, much more troubling, a vice_president@...
carbon copied on the email, which is the public email address for
Vice President Dick Cheney.
In other words, it would be very smart poker if some disloyal
Democratic staffer or a Republican staffer to "accidentally" send
Cheney the list of all those who were revealing secrets about DOJ.
There have been some Republican leaks of damaging testimony in the
past. What would it take for someone to "accidentally" make this tip
line backfire--to make it serve the intelligence purposes of those
trying to avoid responsibility for politicizing DOJ, rather than the
opposite?

By G.F. Scott
October 28, 2007

What constitutes a “Revolving Door” as in corrupted government and industry? Employees who start in industry and move to government and use their position, authority or influence to aid, or facilitate their former employer in achieving corporate goals is one scenario. They may be able to influence development and writing of government policies and regulations as well as how government policies and regulations will be implemented and enforced. Employees who start out in government, and then move to industry using their previous connections, ability to influence, intimidate, or coerce former colleagues, or employees previously supervised in order to aid or facilitate their new employer’s corporate goals is another scenario. Or someone who starts in government, may be lured, or coerced into acting in industry’s best interests and then later may be offered the high paying pay-off job at the company they helped while they were in federal employ. Any of these scenarios, potentially ethically challenging, can involve quid pro quo agreements for the benefit of individuals or corporations and may not in the best interest of the taxpayers or our government. And evidence is available that shows that some employees move back and forth between government and industry positions repeatedly, potentially repeating questionable conflict of interest activities over time.

Nearly always, financial gain is a big component of these types of arrangements. Because of the risks to government interests there are currently policies in place prohibiting an employee moving from a position of power, authority, influence or oversight concerning a particular contractor, directly to a position in that contractor’s employ. The purpose of these policies is to avoid the possible compromises or quid pro quo “deals” that might be arranged which might not be in the taxpayers or government’s best interests. Generally there are stipulated cooling off periods required, before employees may make certain job movements.

How can one tell if it is just a smart career move or indeed is a revolving door maneuver, complete with the typical manipulation, corruption, and payoff one might expect? It’s not always an easy thing to identify, until the person proves himself or herself by word and deed what their goals and purposes are. However, a person’s education, professional experiences, political connections and other elements may be illuminating and an indication of possible conflict of interest.

One of the most noted cases of Revolving Door Corruption recently, was that of D.D., who served as a government employee, (USAF), for a number of years, vocally advocating for a particular defense contractor while doing her contracting job, instead of advocating for the benefit of the taxpayers in government defense contracts. Eventually, D.D. left government employ and resurfaced as an employee of the very company she had championed while managing government defense contracting, which benefited that company. After information came out and controversy erupted over the infamous “Tanker Deal” D.D., the Defense Contractor’s top acquisition official, and the Defense Contractor’s Chief Financial Officer, M.S. were both fired by the Defense Contractor, and after a legal battle both pled guilty to conflict of interest and ethics crimes and were sentenced accordingly.

Here are some examples of other possible Revolving Door scenarios:

A.E. started out as a legislative assistant for National Security Affairs for a Representative to the House of Representatives, and then moved on to serve as an employee of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, where he then spent 13 years learning his craft, and had been promoted to the position of staff director. From staff director of the House Committee on Armed Services, he was recruited to move to a large Defense Contractor, taking the position of Vice President, Aircraft & Missiles Programs, in the company’s Government Relations office in Washington DC.

His new corporate duties were to be responsible for leading the development and execution of government relations strategies for the company’s programs and issues related to the Department of Defense and in support of the company’s Aircraft & Missiles business unit headquartered in St. Lois, Missouri. The company states in a press release that their Aircraft and Missiles group manages numerous Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps programs as well as Aerospace Support programs and the Joint Strike Fighter program as well. His new employer waxed eloquently about this new employee’s attributes in the same press release, stating “We are proud to have a true professional with such proven leadership skills and extensive experience in Washington D.C., as we strive to become more customer-focused, this employee’s vast knowledge of the defense department’s programs and policies will serve us well.” It appears A.E. is still in this position, and involved in various activities to plan and coordinate efforts to influence decisions and win contracts for his current defense industry employer.

G.G. started out as a Security Specialist for Defense Investigative Service (now called Defense Security Service), and was over time, promoted to Deputy Director, Industrial Security. G.G. was very active in professional organizations and in government “reinvention” and reform, including promoting major changes in the relationship between government oversight and industry, particularly in advocating for involving industry in the writing of policy and procedural changes, and reworking how oversight would be allowed to work within the agency. He was a presenter and active participant at conferences in the security field. He left his management position at DSS and went directly to the position of Director, Security and Fire Protection and Facility Security Officer at a large defense contractor, at that time based in Seattle. There is evidence to suggest that he continued to try to influence and/or coerce former colleagues and subordinates in DSS regarding implementation of policy, regulations, and enforcement and oversight activities involving G.G.’s new defense contractor employer.

C.H. founded a business with her partner/husband. She then became the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense C3I. She was active in the government “reinvention” activities also in her role of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security and Information Operations in the George W. Bush Administration, replacing William Leonard in November 2001. Prior to taking Leonard’s job, she worked with DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency), and was a member of the Defense Science Board (DSB).

Subsequently, her company, “actually a one man shop run by a government consultant,” (her husband), was awarded lucrative contracts in Iraq while she continued to remain in her Defense Department government position. Her company was hired by SAIC (Science Applications International Corp.), said to be one of the most politically connected government contractors holding government contracts in Iraq.

She subsequently gave testimony about TALON in a hearing before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, urging it’s purchase and use by the government. TALON, (a program run by the JPEN program), was developed by CellExchange Inc, which is a defense-contracting partner of SAIC. C.H. underwent an investigation because of allegations of conflict of interest, but denied anything improper had occurred.

Most recently, C.H. has joined the Board of advisors for Cybrinth LLC, which deals in data custody and information security. She is also on the Boards of Oakley Networks, a leading force in the Insider Threat prevention market and ICx advanced technology and sensor solutions for military and homeland security, all of which are actively seeking government contracts.

Now, consider again the definition of Revolving Door, and the intent of the prohibitions of such activities for government and industry employees. These are but a few of the examples of questionable government and industry employee movements and activities. It seems reasonable to question the lack of government enforcement of even current policies intended to avert conflict of interest and other corruptions, let alone the lack of development of new stricter personnel policies to assure ethics in government contracting.