Rep. Waxman Questions GSA Plans to Contract Out Contract Oversight
In a letter to GSA Administrator Lurita Doan, Chairman Waxman asks for a briefing on GSA’s plans to expand the role of contractors into contract oversight and management. He also asks that GSA halt implementation of the proposal until Congress has a chance to conduct its oversight.
http://oversight.house. Gov

Jvne T4,2007
The Honorable Lurita A. Doan
Administrator
U.S. General Services Administration
1800 F Street, NW
Washington, DC 20405
Dear Madam Administrator:
I am writing regarding the General Services Administration's plan to expand the role of
contractors into the government's traditional role of contract oversight and management. Given
the costly lessons of the past six years with contractors overseeing contractors, I am concerned
that your proposal may cause conflicts of interest and result in unnecessary waste, fraud, and
abuse. For these reasons, I request a detailed briefing on your proposal, and I ask that you delay
its implementation until GSA demonstrates whether necessary safeguards are in place.
According to an article published in the Federal Times, GSA plans to add "acquisition
support services" to the "Mission Oriented Business Integrated Services" portion of the Federal
Supply Schedule. The article reports that acquisition support contractors will have important
oversight responsibilities, such as writing statements of work, evaluating bid proposals,
reviewing offers, and drafting task orders. Rich Elgin, a GSA contracting official, is quoted
saying: "the contractor could be issued a task order against their contract to not just perform
oversight services, but also do the actual performance of the program in conjunction with the
agency."'
This proposal raises several concerns. First, it creates a risk of significant conflicts of
interest. GSA officials have claimed that they might be able to protect against these types of
conflicts, suggesting that contracting officers "could require a contractor to certify there is no
conflict of interest."' The Committee's procurement oversight does not generate confidence in
this approach, however.

'”Need Help with Your Contracting Workload? Hire a Contractor, Federal Times (May
17,2007).”

1n 2004,I joined with Representative John Dingell, Senator Byron Dorgan, and Senator
Ron Wyden in issuing a report examining contractors performing oversight in lraq.' The report
found significant conflicts of interest between these oversight contractors. For example,
although Parsons had close business ties to Fluor, the Administration awarded Parsons two
contracts to oversee $3.3 billion in public works projects by several other contractors in Iraq,
including Fluor. Similarly, the report found that another oversight contractor, CH2M Hill, had
ongoing domestic contractual relationships with three of the firms it was responsible for
overseeing: Washington Group lnternational, Fluor, and AMEC. The report concluded that
neither Parsons nor CH2M Hill was an independent watchdog.
Our findings were confirmed by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
1n2006, the Special Inspector General determined that the Bush Administration's decision to let
a private contractor oversee the six main reconstruction contracts in Iraq resulted in inefficient
management and aggravated existing problems. The Special Inspector General concluded that
"the large-scale reconstruction and stability operations in Iraq could not be solved by contracting
out these duties."a
Similar problems were identified earlier this year at the Department of Homeland
Security. At a hearing on February 8, 2007, the Committee learned that although the consulting
firm Booz Allen had a significant business relationship with Boeing, the Department had hired
Booz Allen employees to provide management and oversight services for a multi-billion contract
with Boeing called the "Secure Border Initiative."
Another problem is the potential for additional waste, fraud, and abuse. The federal
government now spends hundreds of billions of dollars each year on contracts. Over the last six
years, federal auditors have repeatedly warned that a large and recurring problem in contract
management has been inadequate oversight by federal procurement officials. Outsourcing
additional procurement responsibilities could contribute to the erosion of procurement oversight
by federal officials, leading to more wasteful spending.
This is not the first time that GSA has floated a proposal to increase the outsourcing of
contract oversight. In December 2006, GSA announced a plan to replace experienced federal
auditors working for the GSA Inspector General with inexperienced private contractors. After I
joined with Transportation Chairman Oberstar and Congresswoman Norton to raise concerns,
GSA made the wise determination that the plan was unsound.
3 Contractors Overseeing Contractors: Conflicts of Interest Undermine Accountability in
Iraq, Committee on Government Reform, Special lnvestigations Division, U.S. House of
Representatives (May 18,2004) (online athtþ:lloversight.house.gov/documents/
200 40 623 | 23 249 -8 628 l .pdf).
a Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons
Learned in Human Capítal Management (Jan.2006).

There should be similar opportunity for congressional input here. For these reasons, I
request that you provide a briefing to the Committee prior to June 29,2007, regarding the
outsourcing proposal. I also request that you halt the implementation of this proposal until
Congress has a chance to conduct its oversight.
If you have any questions about this request, please contact Margaret Daum or David
Leviss with the Committee staff at (202) 225-5420.

Sincerely,
Henry A. Waxman
Chairman
cc: Tom Davis
Ranking Minority Member

1. "Boeing Parts and Rules Bent, Whistleblowers Say"
by Florence Graves adn Sarah Kehaulani Goo
4/17/06
http://www.brandeis.edu/omvestogate/pol/boeingstory-worddoc.htm

2. "Are Boeing's Big Jets Safe?"
by Sarah Kaplan
10/13/2005
http://www.motherjones.com/news/update/2006/10/flightrisk.html

3. "FAA Investigators Fail to Examine Jets in Question"
by Frank Koughan and Sheila Kaplan
12/5/05
http://www.motherjones.com/news/updated/2005/12/flight risk3.html

4. "Local Whistleblower goes after Boeing"
by Matthew Kish
4/17/06
http://portland.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2006/08/21/story2.html

“Ex-Boeing Worker Accused Of Downloading Documents And Leaking To Reporters.” And so the story begins.

In a July 10, 2007 article by Steve Miletich, Seattle Times staff reporter, a Mr. Gerald Eastman of Kent, WA is accused of “16 felony counts of first-degree computer trespass” in court papers filed by the King County Prosecutor’s Office. So what’s the story? And, what’s the story-behind-the story? It seems that Eastman worked as a quality-control inspector at Boeing in the Pacific Northwest. According to Eastman, he was trying to call attention to quality-control problems at Boeing. These quality-control problems were serious concerns about safety of the airplanes for those civilians or military who must fly. And according to the July 10, 2007 Seattle Times article, Eastman “had been downloading highly sensitive computer files” for more than two years and providing information to The Times. The article goes on to say “as a quality-control inspector, Eastman had unfettered access to Boeing’s computer system so he could perform his job, according to papers. But, Eastman violated a company policy that limits access to areas relevant and necessary to perform work duties, the paper alleges.”

Let’s think about these statements, and try to put them into some kind of perspective. Eastman is self-described as a whistleblower employee concerned about serious safety quality-control issues at The Boeing Company. What has Eastman done to try to resolve those concerns? Has he gone to his management? If so, how did they (Boeing) handle the situation? It would appear that Eastman remained concerned enough that he sought additional help outside of his company. Obviously, he was concerned enough to first carry his concerns to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). So how did they handle the situation? Apparently, they did not feel that Eastman’s concerns had any merit; in other words, they took no further action. O.K., so then what? Mr. Eastman remained concerned enough that he carried those concerns on to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Office of Inspector General (OIG). So how does the DOT/OIG handle whistleblower information?

Interestingly, the DOT appears to have outsourced (hired) a contractor company to screen all their whistleblower cases. Now, how does that work? A contractor screening other contractor and governmental whistleblower’s information? So a contractor company has first cut on deciding what information, if any, has any merit! I’ll bet that works well. Talk about your self-licking governmental lollypop. Nope… no problems here!

So let’s continue. Eastman had unfettered access to Boeing’s computer system, and violated a company policy that limits access to areas relevant and necessary to perform work duties. Sounds good on the surface, doesn’t it? But, let’s look a little deeper and ask a few more questions about what has been said.

First, you need to know, and understand, that The Boeing Company in Seattle is one of the United States largest companies. I am sure that no one is surprised by that fact. The Boeing Company is also one of the largest United States defense contractors. Again, that is hardly new information to anyone. Many defense procurements with various levels of classified parameters are worked on at Boeing Seattle. This means that Boeing has legal obligations; legal obligations, both as a U.S. corporation and as a U.S. defense contractor. Let’s look a little further.

Boeing, as a U.S. corporation, has a legal obligation to adhere to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). So who in the federal government oversees and enforces the EAR. Well, much of the EAR is covered by the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)/Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). BIS principally oversees the Commerce Commodity List (CCL) items. These items are unclassified information and/or technology that have various export restrictions placed upon them. In short, this means that non-U.S. citizens will not have access (in any form) to the information without going through the proper U.S. Government export control process to seek and receive a properly executed export license to export that information and/or technology to said individual’s country. However, the EAR is not all inclusive. The EAR does not cover all goods, services and technologies.

More specialized types of information and technology may be covered under the United States Government’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). And, yes, Boeing as a U.S. corporation, has the legal obligation to adhere to the ITAR. The U.S. Department of State (DOS) has authority over defense articles and defense services. But, the DOS has assistance from several governmental agencies for day-to-day oversight and enforcement of export restrictions placed upon ITAR controlled information and technology. Classified information and technology resident at a U.S. defense contractor is the prerogative of the DOS in concert with the Defense Security Service (DSS). Unclassified ITAR controlled information and technology historically was the oversight responsibility of U.S. Customs (now a part of the Department of Homeland Security). More recently, DSS has also been tasked to oversee and enforce proper control of unclassified ITAR controlled information and technology resident at U.S. defense contractors.

So Boeing has legal obligations to protect various types of export controlled information and technology- both classified and unclassified. And Eastman has had “unfettered access” and has been downloading “highly sensitive computer files” for more than two years off a system that depends upon a company policy to limit an individual’s access to areas relevant and necessary to perform work duties. In other words, words or “a company policy” are what restrict an employees’ access to “highly sensitive computer files” that apparently not everyone has the same common need-to-know for. Mr. Eastman’s access has been restricted by words? So Mr. Eastman has been charged with 16 felony counts for computer trespass of a system he was authorized access into, but portions of ‘the system’ were being protected by words? That is interesting indeed.

Is this an insight into how Boeing may be protecting unclassified export controlled information and technology? Has anyone asked that question? Has anyone, besides Boeing personnel, really investigated, or is the U.S. government depending upon company personnel to investigate, and the local government to prosecute? And speaking of investigation, has anyone done an internet search pertaining to Mr. Eastman. Gerald Eastman seems to have the following web site [ http://www.thelastinspector.com ] devoted to his particular situation, and his concerns with regard to his former employer (Boeing).

In review of Mr. Eastman’s web site, he speaks to concerns for questionable export control situations with regard to export controlled advanced technologies resident within Boeing’s portion of the B-2 program. Now that really is interesting. What if Gerald Eastman is right?

These charges of 16 felony counts for computer trespass of a system he was authorized access into, but portions of ‘the system’ were being protected by words, come from the same Boeing company found to be holding 30,000+ pages, prior to contract award, of classified U.S. Air Force information relating to satellite launch vehicles that Lockheed had been working on.

BOEING PRESSES CHARGES ON WHISTLEBLOWER TO CREATE TERROR, AND SILENCE OTHER POSSIBLE WHISTLEBLOWERS?

The Boeing Company unleashed a new wave of terror this week on their employees, by filing charges on a previous employee of Boeing, who was fired for becoming a whistleblower regarding issues of airplane inspection and airplane safety, through the King County Prosecutor’s Office, the Seattle Times reported in two articles this week. It is clear to this observer after checking into these stories and what is behind the stories that there is more to this than disclosed by the Seattle Times in its initial coverage
.
It is not a secret that there are numerous problems that have occurred with certain defense contractors, in recent years, (Boeing being one of them), and perhaps a bit less visible that there are currently a number of investigations being done by several agencies regarding other allegations against certain defense contractors, including Boeing, some of them dealing with very serious allegations which may overshadow the Darlene Druyun/Tanker Deal in their reach and significance.

This observer’s sources have indicated that recently the Boeing Company was on a vigorous hunt through the underbrush to “track down those employees who are talking to federal investigators and others.” It appears they’ve found their target, or perhaps as in Bradbury’s “Fahrenheit 451,” a convenient one anyway. This is a caution to anyone else that may be just out for a walk in the neighborhood.

These two articles, “Ex-Boeing worker accused of downloading documents and leaking to reporters” and Charges in Boeing download case” may be found at:

http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=webboeing10m&date=20070710

And

http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=boeing11m&date=20070711

This is the petition sent today signed by numerous citizens. If you are interested in helping further with assuring that whistleblowers are accorded the respect and process they are entitled to by law from the Office of Special Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection Board, please contact Joe Carson: jpcarson@tds.net
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Petition to Congress about “Rule of Law” in OSC and MSPB

Since OSC was established as an independent agency in 1989, over 10,000 federal employees have submitted about 25,000 PPP (Prohibited Personnel Practices, complaints, alleging about 50,000 specific PPP’s. We claim that OSC unlawfully closed over 98% of its PPP investigations since 1989 without making and/or appropriately reporting its statutory required PPP
determination, “whether there are reasonable grounds to believe a PPP has occurred, exists, or is to be taken.”

We claim that in 100% of its PPP investigations closed since 1994, OSC failed to provide the complainant the “termination statement” required by the 1994 amendments to the WPA and/or failed to provide the extensive information it describes if requested by the complainant. We claim OSC’s non-compliance with its duties, prejudiced about 3000 subsequent whistleblower appeals to the MSPB.

We claim that since 1989 MSPB has failed to conduct the authorized and required oversight of OSC’s compliance with the letter and spirit of the WPA to make its required report to Congress, “whether the public interest in a civil service free of PPP’s is being adequately protected,” enabling OSC’s non-compliance with its duties.

We understand that licensed attorneys in these agencies, specifically hired to implement specific laws to protect federal employees from PPP’s, can apparently invoke “attorney-client” privilege to justify “looking the other way,” if not actively covering-up their and their agencies’ non-compliance with those laws. We note that neither agency has
an independent Inspector General, in fact the MSPB General Counsel functions as its IG too - despite the obvious conflict of professional interest.

We, representatives and advocates of the direct victims of OSC’s non-compliance with its statutory duties, (we think every American, to some degree, is an indirect victim) respectfully PETITION Congress to do the following:

1) Investigate OSC and MSPB as necessary to substantiate or dispel our concerns.

2) If our concerns are substantiated, then direct OSC and MSPB to scrupulously comply with their respective statutory duties to prevent more victims.

3) If our concerns are substantiated, then acknowledge the 10,000 or more direct victims - particularly the 3000 or so whose subsequent whistleblower appeals to MSPB were prejudiced by OSC’s non-compliance with law – and evaluate how these victims can obtain some measure of justice.